

SECURITY GRADING

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FILE No. NE Q 1/2. (Part C) (88-127)

TITLE: PROBLEMS OF KURDS IN IRAQ

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BBC B

B52 KURDISH PARTY CONGRESS: FULL COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT,
SAYS BARZANI

(BAGHDAD RADIO) ADDRESSING THE KURDISTANI DEMOCRATIC PARTY
CONGRESS, WHICH OPENED IN THE NAWBARDAN AREA OF JALALAN REGION,
IRBIL PROVINCE, TODAY, THE PARTY LEADER, MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI,
SAID THAT THERE WAS FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND
THE PEOPLE TO APPLY THE HISTORIC 11TH MARCH STATEMENT AND TO
ESTABLISH SOUND NATIONAL UNITY. WE SHOULD FORGET THE NEGATIVE
ASPECTS OF THE PAST AND ALSO INDIVIDUAL MALICE HE SAID.

BARZANI ADDED: I HAVE GREAT HOPES THAT OUR CONGRESS AND OUR
PARTY, IN COOPERATION WITH THE BAATH PARTY AND THE NATIONAL FORCE,
WILL BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE, AMITY, AND PEACE IN OUR DEAR
IRAQ.


MF BBC MON 2107 1/7 DW

B51 KURDISH 2: CONGRESS WILL STRENGTHEN NATIONAL UNITY:
BAATH LEADER

MUHAMMAD SULAYMAN, MEMBER OF THE BAATH PARTY NATIONAL
COMMAND AND HEAD OF THE PARTY'S DELEGATION TO THE CONGRESS,
SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE CONGRESS, WHICH WAS BEING HELD
FOLLOWING THE PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION OF THE KURDISH
QUESTION, WOULD CONTRIBUTE PROMINENTLY TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF
THE FIGHTING UNITY BETWEEN THE ARAB AND KURDISH PEOPLES AND
INCREASE NATIONAL UNITY.

HE SAID: THE BAATH PARTY FIRMLY BELIEVES IN THE NATIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE FRATERNAL KURDISH PEOPLE, AND THAT THE STRUGGLE
OF THE ARAB AND KURDISH PEOPLES IS ONE STRUGGLE, HAVING THE SAME
GOALS AND THE SAME POLICIES.

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Kurdish
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Another act of treason was discovered this week. While in Algeria we visited Algerian chemical fertiliser plants. During our conversation we asked the Algerian officials about the real cost of producing one ton of fertilisers. They said: It costs 15 dinars here.

We asked the officials the same question six or eight months ago. We asked them about the production cost of one ton of fertilisers. They told us 38 dinars. The Basra chemical fertiliser plant under construction will begin production this winter at a cost of 38 dinars per ton. We are confused. The ton in the market is sold at 30 dinars. How can we sell at this price? The peasant will say that he will not buy the fertilisers at this price. He can do without the chemical fertilisers. In our discussion with the Algerians they said: We are certain of what we have said. Send your experts to us so that we can study the matter and find the defect. Either we or you are wrong.

It is a fact that had the Iraqi officials come to the Revolution Command Council before building the plant and had we known the production cost would be 38 dinars, we would have said: We will not build the plant. We would rather import the fertilisers.

For eight months now we have been discussing the question. Should we close the plant after spending millions of dinars on it and when it is about to start production? At what price are we going to sell to you, the peasants and your brothers? Should we sell at a loss the way we sell bread [Arabic: sammun]?

A meeting was held to discuss the matter. We found that by adding the averages of the white and green fertilisers and dividing this by two, the result would be one-third of 38 dinars [sentence as heard]. Yes, we found this out yesterday. Why? Because the devout experts who answered 38 dinars whenever we asked them about the price wanted to undermine the Government's efforts to build projects in the interest of this country. This is treason.

When actions are taken against such persons, people claim that the Government is fighting devout persons, ulema and tribes. The brothers and comrades have already told you about the increase in rumours and allegations. I want you to be aware of the aims behind them so that the revolution will continue its progress in the service of the people.

Once again I wish your conference success. Peace be upon you.

Kurdish Democratic Party Conference

Baghdad home service in Arabic 15.00 GMT 1.7.70

Excerpts from report:

The eighth conference of the Kurdish Democratic Party was held at 09.00 today in the Nawbardan area of Jalalah region, Arbil Province, under the auspices of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. The conference was opened on behalf of the President by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party. The conference was attended by the Ba'th Party delegation led by Comrade Muhammad Sulayman, member of the National Command of the Party; delegations of the national parties, forces and organisations; a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation; a delegation of the Kurdish Democratic Party organisation in Europe; a delegation of the Kurdish Students' Federation in Europe; a delegation of the Kurdish Fraternity Association in Lebanon; a delegation of Kurdish youths from the United States; and representatives of popular and professional organisations of the Party in Iraq. The conference was also attended by the members of the Party Political Bureau and Central Committee; the Kurdish ministers; and 500 delegates representing the Party rank and file.

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At the beginning of the morning session, which was held under the slogan "Peace, friendship, and national unity", the conference observed one minute's silence to mourn the martyrs of Kurdistan and Iraq.

Barzani, in an impromptu speech, then greeted the delegations and guests, saying: We are proud of your attendance at our conference held under the auspices of HE President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. I talk to you not in my capacity as the Party leader but as a servant of the Iraqi people, and in the name of fraternity, peace and national unity. I hope all of us will co-operate for Iraq's progress and prosperity.

Barzani declared that there was full co-operation between the Government and the people to apply the historic 11th March statement and establish a solid national unity. Everybody should have good will and a pure heart, and our goal should be to serve the sons of the Iraqi people, Barzani added. We should forget the negative aspects of the past and also individual malevolence.

Concluding his statement, Barzani said: I have great hope that our conference and our Party, in co-operation with the Ba'th Party and the national forces, will be able to establish justice, amity, friendship and peace in our dear Iraq.

Muhammad Sulayman, member of the Ba'th Party National Command and head of the Party's delegation to the conference, then delivered a speech in which he said:

In the name of the Ba'th Party and the victorious 17th July Revolution Command, I greet you and hope that at this conference you will achieve complete progress and success. The conference is the fruit of the great achievement of the struggle of both our parties and our peoples on 11th March. We are confident that this conference, which is being held after the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question, will prominently contribute to the consolidation of the fighting unity between the Arab and the Kurdish peoples, expand the national unity, and strengthen the peaceful democratic solution.

In the name of my colleagues in the Party I confirm to you, on the occasion of the opening of this conference, that the Ba'th Party firmly believes in the national rights of the fraternal Kurdish people, and that the struggle of the Arab and the Kurdish peoples is one struggle, having the same goals and the same policies...

The 11th March statement was not only a great historical achievement but remains a very valuable and dear achievement to the millions of Arabs and Kurds who have given their consent to it...

Omdurman Radio on Reactionaries in South Sudan

Omdurman in English 16.30 GMT 30.6.70

Excerpts from commentary:

The Minister of Interior, Maj. Faruq Hamadallah, has disclosed at his televised and radio press conference last week many facts in connection with the conspiracy of last March which aimed at assassinating men of the revolution Government. The Minister also spoke about the activities of the conspirators in the South. He said that documents and papers found with the plotters, led by Hadi Abd ar-Rahman, confirmed that they were working for gathering the hostile and mutinying elements in Southern Sudan with the purpose of escalating the tension there for the service of their own ends. Several references to the South and southerners were made in these documents. One of the documents or letters which was sent to Hadi said that the situation in the South was worse and tense...

June 15th, 1970

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

NE Q 1/2

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**BARZANI LAUDS PERSONAL TIES WITH PRESIDENT BAKR; Kurds
KURDISH PARTY CONGRESS TO BE HELD ON 1ST OF JULY**

The Kurdish national leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, has said in a press conference on Tuesday that "strong personal ties" existed between him and Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr. He also stressed that the March 11th Declaration which settled the Kurdish problem in Northern Iraq "came in the interest of all Iraqis." According to the Iraqi press yesterday, Barzani said that enemies of the Iraqi people tried to present the fighting between Kurds and Iraqis before the March 11th Declaration was reached "as a sectarian conflict", but their efforts have failed as a result of the agreement reached between the Kurds and the ruling Baathist regime.

Kurdish Congress. On the other hand, a member of the Political Bureau of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Mr. Mahmoud Osman, has announced that the party will hold its 8th congress on July 1st "under the slogan of peace, brotherhood and national unity." The congress will last until the 10th of July, and will convene at Klala area in the north.

He told the official Iraq News Agency (INA) that about 400 persons representing the bases of the party will attend the congress in addition to a delegation representing the Arab Baath Socialist Party and others representing the various national forces in the country. Among the subjects which will be considered by the congress are the March 11th Declaration, the relationship between the ruling Arab Baath Party and the KDP. The congress will also discuss ideological and organizational matters of the KDP.

Vice President. Osman also said that the congress will decide on the person who will be nominated for the post of Vice President of Iraq, in accordance with the March 11th Declaration which provides that the Kurdish community in the country will have a Vice President. Osman said that the would-be Vice President will be elected from the seven-member Political Bureau of the KDP. These are: Nuri Chawis, Minister of Works and Housing; Majid Mahmoud, Minister for the Affairs of the North; Saleh Al Youssefi, Minister of State; Dr. Mahmoud Osman; Habib Karim, Secretary General of the KDP; Aziz Akrawi; and Ali Abdullah, Editor of the Kurdish newspaper AL TAAKHI.

* * *

P.O. MUM 7/7

COMMANDO ACTION. Meanwhile, the Baghdad daily AL THAWRA, organ of the ruling Baath Party, has continued its campaign in support of coordination between the commando organizations and Arab governments and armies. An article on this line was reproduced yesterday by the Beirut daily AL KIFAH, which speaks for the Iraqi Baathist regime (see our bulletin yesterday).

The article said that commando action has now come to be threatened by two main factors: 1-Some commando groups have become fronts for certain Arab political parties and governments; and 2- efforts aimed at recruiting the largest number of commandos without consideration of the quality and conduct of the new recruits, who eventually diverted the commando movement from undertaking its basic duties against the enemy.

The article also warned of the danger of the small commando groups, and said that these must be fought because they allegedly aim at sabotaging the commando action and distorting its image. It also called for purging the "mercenaries" from the commando movement.

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THE TIMES
- 4 JUL 1970

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- 7 JUL 1970

NE Q 1/2

Kurd to be Iraq Vice-President

From PAUL MARTIN

Beirut, July 3

Under the banner of Kurdish-Arab unity, Kurds from farther afield than the boundaries of Iraq have gathered in the northern headquarters of their leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, to elect Iraq's first Kurdish Vice-President.

The gathering, the eighth congress of the Kurdish Democratic Party (K.D.P.), will also assess the progress of the settlement reached with the Baathist regime almost four months ago.

Although the long struggle against successive Iraq regimes has hardened Barzani and his followers to possible overnight reversals, there is no doubt that they have derived a certain amount of satisfaction from the fruits of their hard-won peace. Indeed, as the Kurds and Baathists join hands in their new brotherhood, this first congress since the abortive 1966 settlement with the Arif regime has assumed something of a festive air.

"Long live the Arab-Kurdish Republic of Iraq" is one of the slogans that have been strung up on the approaches to the border village of Kallala, where the congress is being held. Others read: "Iraq marches on under the leadership of President Bakr and Mullah Mustafa Barzani" and "On the rock of Arab-Kurdish unity all reactionary and imperialist conspiracies shall be crushed."

In the months since the declaration of March 11, granting the Kurds autonomy in areas where they are in the majority, their relations with the ruling Baathists have grown increasingly warm. They have obtained their promised five seats in the Government — their men hold the portfolios

of Northern Development, Agriculture, Public Works and Municipalities. Kurdish is recognized as an official language and Kurds are playing a more prominent role in the country's administration, especially in the Kurdish-dominated northern areas.

The appointment of a Kurdish Vice-President — to join two Baathist colleagues who were elected by the regime recently — will obviously have an important psychological, if not practical, effect on the Kurds' future.

Ironically, apart from the Kurds the Baathist regime has no political friends inside Iraq. The Kurds have been watching with interest the lack of progress towards the desired national union of political forces and the creation of a National Assembly (promised by the regime).

Reg. 10

Kurds in 1970

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REGISTRY No. 10

July 2nd, 1970

NEQ 112

KURDS HOLD CONGRESS IN NORTHERN IRAQ
"Arab-Kurdish Republic" In Iraq Is Emphasized

Kurds,
Iraq

Kurds, some from as far away as the United States, have converged on a village with the musical name of Kallala in northern Iraq and near the Turkish border. The village, which has been the summer headquarters of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish national leader, is the site of the 8th Congress of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which was to begin formal sessions yesterday. Delegates came from all parts of Iraq, and from Europe, the US and Lebanon. Some even have slipped through from Syria.

From Rawanduz, one of the main centres in the Erbil district on whose northern border Kallala lies, to the site of the congress large placards with slogans on them have been strung up. "Long Live the Arab-Kurdish Republic of Iraq", announced one slogan, and another said: "Iraq Marches On Under the Leadership of President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr and Mulla Mustafa Barzani." A third one said: "On the Rock of Arab-Kurdish Unity All Reactionary and Imperialist Conspiracies Shall Be Crushed." Another still described the Pesh Mergha, the Kurdish irregular army that had fought the Iraqi army off and on for about nine years, as "the protector of the Arab-Kurdish republic."

Baghdad's Kurdish daily, AL TAAKHI (Brotherhood) hailed it "an historic moment." And it appears to be so. This is the first time that the Kurds appear genuinely and relatively satisfied that a settlement of their problem may finally stick. In a way, the congress is a celebration of the declaration issued by the Iraqi Government on March 11th for settlement of the Kurdish question in Iraq on basis of an autonomy for the Kurds in the areas in the northern districts where they form a majority.

The KDP's 7th congress was held late in 1966, in wake of the June 29th Declaration, then made by former Premier Dr Abdel Rahman Al Bazzaz, which too provided a certain degree of settlement to the Kurdish problem. But there was already then profound doubt that an actual solution of the problem was in the offing. Therefore, the 7th congress was held under an atmosphere of uncertainty --and all it did was to decide on a wait-and-see policy. The festive mood which characterizes the 8th congress was completely absent from the 7th congress, and the Baghdad press hardly mentioned the Kurdish meeting then. Yesterday and the day before, the news of the 8th congress was top story in the Baghdad newspapers and in newscasts by the official Baghdad Radio.

A delegation representing the ruling Baath Party is attending the Kurdish congress now. Kurdish delegations coming from abroad were given free transport by the government-run railroad. Their passports or entry visas were hardly scrutinized when they arrived at Baghdad airport a week ago.

A Reason To Celebrate. The Kurds have all the reason to celebrate. They already have five Ministers in the Iraqi Cabinet, and the 8th congress is scheduled to choose the Kurdish Vice President, the first the Kurds in Iraq have ever had. The Government has already announced that a new provisional constitution incorporating the Kurdish rights as spelled out in the March 11th Declaration will be proclaimed this month as part of celebrations marking the 2nd anniversary the Baathist take-over in Iraq. Another Government announcement said that a census of

REPORTS, Cont'd

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July 2nd, 1970

Kurds, Iraq



Iraqi population, which will also determine the size of the Kurdish population and where it centred, will be held on October 1st. And obviously as a re-assurance to the Kurds, two UN census experts will supervise the population count.

The Congress. The congress was to open under Barzani, in his capacity as President of the KDP, at 9 a.m. yesterday. A report was to be read in the morning session by Habib Mohammed Karim, the KDP's Secretary General. Mr Karim told the official IRAQ NEWS AGENCY yesterday that the report would cover local, Arab and international developments, and more specifically the March 11th Declaration. It will, furthermore, outline "the missions faced by the KDP" under the new situation, including the proposed establishment of a national front in Iraq with the ruling Baath Party and other leftist elements.

From abroad came representatives of the Kurdish Association in the US, the Kurdish Association in Europe, the Kurdish Students Association in Europe, and the Kurdish Brotherhood Association in Lebanon. The delegation from Syria was not mentioned publicly for its own protection, since the KDP branch in Syria is suppressed as all Kurdish national activity is.

Also attending as observers were delegates representing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fatah, the major commando group, according to Baghdad newspapers yesterday. [A hero's funeral last weekend was given to a Kurdish commando who was a member of Fatah and who was killed in action against the Israelis. He was the first Kurdish commando to die in fighting with the Israelis].

Problems Ahead. The KDP congress will have to tackle the problems ahead --this time they are problems of peace not war. One of the congress' missions is to either give the KDP's Central Committee a fresh vote of confidence, or vote to elect new members. Most members of the present committee are expected to be retained --as is the unchallenged leadership of Mulla Barzani, who led the Kurds during the nine years of off-again on-again war with the Iraqi army.

Kurds will have to start thinking of actually governing their areas, which would come soon when the autonomy is applied. They will have to elect --or appoint-- local councils, and local governors, and run their own schools and social affairs.

Kurds have had a certain degree of experience in running their affairs, since they used to have actual control on large areas in the north during the fighting. But they were running those areas as military not civilian authorities. Readjusting from a state of war to a state of peace is always a problem.

Kurds have also shown signs that they want to turn their attention to Kurdish communities in other countries. There have been speculations already, not yet firmly confirmed, of a small Kurdish uprising starting in neighbouring Iran.

The Kurdish nationalist movement has, furthermore, shown concern about conditions under which Kurds are treated in Syria. The Kurdish European Association has recently released text of what it described as a report said to have been prepared by a former Minister of Interior in Syria under the present regime urging the government in Damascus to check the rise of a Kurdish nationalist movement from now. The reported text, said prepared by Mohammed Taleb Hilal, suggested moving the Kurds from the northeast of Syria, where they are concentrated, and have them dispersed throughout the country. An English version of the report, also published by the Kurds, had a red cover with a Syrian boot trampling on the word "Kurds."

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118 JUL 1970

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NEQ 112
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Rights of Kurds recognized

Baghdad July 17.—A new provisional constitution acknowledging the Kurds and the Arabs as the two nationalities of Iraq, and Kurdish and Arabic as the official languages of the Kurdistan region, has been announced by President al-Bakr. The constitution, read by the President in a Baghdad radio broadcast last night, deals particularly with the rights of the Kurds in Iraq. The Kurds and the Baghdad Government signed an agreement last March ending a nine-year war in which Kurds sought autonomy for their region.

This fourth provisional constitution in 12 years also contains the following provisions:—

Iraq is a democratic republic and Islam is the state religion;

Members of the Council of

Revolutionary Command (C.C.R.), limited to 12 persons, will be chosen from the National Command Party;

The C.C.R. is the highest authority of the state. Its President, who must be elected by a two-thirds majority, is also head of state;

The Vice-President of the C.C.R. will take over the functions of the head of state in case of absence or sickness of the President.

The constitution, which has 67 articles, provides for the establishment of a legislative branch called the National Council in the framework of a permanent constitution whose date has not yet been set.

The National Council's composition and the qualifications of the members will be defined by a special decree to be published later.

The President will be responsible to the C.C.R. and not to

the National Council and the Vice-Presidents and Ministers will be responsible only to the President.—Agence France Presse.

Beirut, July 17.—A revolutionary court in Baghdad has sentenced to death in secret General Abdul Aziz Uqaili, a former Minister of Defence, and Ata Abdul Wahab, a former senior finance official.

They were accused of plotting with the United States Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the Baathist regime in Iraq.

Six other people were sentenced to death in their absence. Another was gaoled for 18 years and one for 10 years.

Although the sentences were passed about three weeks ago, the informants said General Uqaili and Mr. Wahab have not yet been executed. The informants said this might indicate that there was a chance of the sentences being commuted.—New York Times News Service.

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REGISTRY No 10

30 JUL 1970

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BAGHDAD.

NEQ

27 July 1970.

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1/4 Enter term file:-

Mr Eynter with a glow.

Arise a determination in Iraq part / Kurdish
relations but no debate with a major breakdown
The Kurds

Dear Sir,

I have delayed writing about the 8th congress of the Kurdish Democratic Party which took place from 1 to 6 July in the expectation, which has been proved false, that an announcement would be made during the 14-17 July celebrations here or shortly thereafter about the Kurdish choice of a Vice President.

2. We have commented elsewhere (Jenner's letter 2/1 of 18 July) on the one aspect of the Kurdish Democratic Party congress which caught the attention of the Arabic press here in Baghdad - the speeches made by representatives of other parties. This in fact turned out to be the major feature of the congress and in retrospect perhaps the most important event at it. Speeches were made by representatives of the Iraqi Communist Party, the National Democrat Party, the Independent Democrats, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Ba'ath Party and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

3. The Ba'ath representative repeated the Central Government line of the importance of the 11 March manifesto in achieving a true solution to the problems of the North and stressing the importance of cooperation between the Progressive forces in Iraq under the patronage of the Ba'ath Party. The Communist delegate Karim Ahmad dwelt on the delicate situation in Iraq which in his words required the forces of the people and their Nationalist Parties to be vigilant and cautious. He said that the Communist Party considered that representatives of all parties and national forces should be invited to a joint meeting to study the establishment of a National Front and to determine its constitution. Salman al Azzawi of the N.D.P. gave his party's support to the Kurdish slogan "Democracy for Iraq and self-government for Kurdistan". In a rather obscure speech Abdul Ilah al Nasrawi of the Arab Socialist movement attacked the Chauvinist policies of successive governments in Iraq which had compelled the Kurdish people to carry arms in defence of their legitimate rights. The obscurity lay in the implication, not openly expressed, that the Ba'ath were as guilty as the others before them.

4. There were also representatives at the congress of the K.D.P. in Syria and of the Kurdish Democratic Youth Movement in Syria and the Lebanon. Both of these in their speeches referred to the oppression and persecution of Kurds in Syria.

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P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.

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5. As regards business transacted at the congress the following are some of the resolutions and recommendations submitted and accepted during the six days.

- (a) To struggle for the implementation of the 11 March manifesto both in letter and spirit in order to ensure self-government (Hukm Dhati) for the people of Kurdistan within the republic of Iraq.
- (b) In view of the existing link between the Arab and Kurdish movement any progress or development achieved in the Arab National Movement in Iraq must be coupled with progress and development in the national rights of the Kurds.
- (c) To support the new Agrarian reform law and ensure that all peasants in Kurdistan obtain land.
- (d) To improve the means of communication within Kurdistan and construct modern roads and railways there. To promote residential projects and the construction of modern villages.
- (e) To struggle for a Revolutionary Democratic Government elected by the people and to ensure economic and social transformation in all fields with guarantees for the freedom of religious views, political views, speech and the press.
- (f) To admit the rights of minorities residing in Iraq and in Kurdistan and ensure the exercise of such rights.
- (g) To establish the right of Iraqi nationality to Kurds wishing it who have been residing in Iraq for a period of not less than five years, such as the Failis, Goyans and Omeryans and others.

There were also four resolutions on the need to develop the economy which were heavily laced with Communist phraseology on the need for industrialization, the development of the public sector, electrification and planned use of resources.

6. On 10 July at the conclusion of the eighth congress a communique was issued stating that 488 representatives had met to discuss the party's affairs and to hear reports on the political progress of the party, the affairs of the revolution, the party's relations with the National authority, the organisation and financial affairs of the party and certain amendments to the party's constitution. The communique claimed that the congress had adopted a number of important decisions and recommendations
/calculated



calculated to strengthen the party and raise its efficiency at all levels. It had also elected a new command and re-elected unanimously Mulla Mustafa al Barzani as President of the party. It expressed Kurdish support for the struggle of the Arabs against Imperialism and Zionism and for the rights of the Palestinians. It called upon other states in which Kurdish people were living to stop their policies of racial persecution and to respond to the Kurds just national and democratic demands. The congress stressed the party's determination to consolidate the alliance between it and the Ba'ath for expediting the implementation of the remaining clauses of the 11 March manifesto.

7. In a reference to the speeches of the other party delegates the communique stated that the congress had unanimously decided to work for the strengthening and expansion of the alliance between the K.D.P. and the Ba'ath so that it might comprise all National Progressive parties in Iraq for the establishment of a Progressive National Front. This with a view to strengthening the home front, ensuring the firm and permanent predominance of the affairs of the people over those hostile to them both within the country and abroad and for the construction of a new Iraq with its people enjoying a revolutionary and democratic system of government. The congress called upon the Central Government to create a suitable atmosphere for this through the establishment of cordial and fraternal relations with these other parties.

8. The congress called for the strengthening of ties between the various nationalities in Iraq and between all citizens of Kurdistan and to resist firmly attempts at arousing hostility to the Kurds among the other minorities. The communique said that the congress found it necessary to mention the economic hardship and poor conditions of health which much of the Kurdish area was suffering and called upon the Central Government to take all possible steps to alleviate the plight of the Kurds by hastening to implement the economic clauses of the 11 March manifesto and by the establishment of economic and health projects.

9. As I have said we have commented on the angry reaction of the Central press to the criticisms expressed by the other political parties at the congress. The Ba'ath government cannot have been pleased either at the fairly severe criticism both expressed and implied in the reports to the congress and in subsequent speeches of dilatoriness on the part of the Central government in implementing the 11 March manifesto. The Kurds also stressed the need for an expansion of the Ba'aths idea of a National Front between the
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twin parties, the K.D.P. and the Ba'ath, with the Ba'ath playing the leading role, into a genuine National Front with proper cooperation between all the Progressive forces.

10. We understand that the congress instead of making the necessary choice of a Vice President merely referred the decision to Mulla Mustafa. No announcement has yet been made as to who will fill this post. It may well be that Barzani feels that the post is of such little importance at this stage that there is no point in putting forward a candidate. ✓

11. The congress seems to have highlighted the deteriorating public relations between the Kurds and the Central government. Another sign of this was the absence from the July celebrations in Baghdad of any formal representative from Barzani. True the Kurdish Ministers in the government were present at most of the functions but it was widely understood that the Ba'ath hoped Barzani himself or at least Idriss his son would appear. Despite these differences however there is no sign of a breakdown of the agreement. |

Yms.
JH
(J.H. Symons)

Copied to:

Chancery,
Tehran.

Chancery,
Beirut.

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~~(150000)~~



BRITISH EMBASSY,
MOSCOW.

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(2/50)

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to Mr. P. M. M.

3/8

Dear Department

RECEIVED IN
31 July, 1970. REGISTRY No. 10
13 AUG 1970
NEQ112.

8th Congress of the Kurdish Democratic Party

Pravda of 30 July contained a Tass announcement that the Central Committee of the CPSU had sent a telegram to the July conference of the KDP, expressing satisfaction with the solution of the Kurdish problem, which corresponded to the interests of the Iraqi people as a whole and its anti-imperialist efforts. The people of Iraq now had the possibility to lead a peaceful, creative life, to strengthen their unity and to increase their contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle against Israeli aggression.

2. Barzany's reply had expressed gratitude for Soviet support in the just struggle of the Iraqi Kurds for their national rights. It also re-affirmed the ambitions of the Iraqi Kurds to strengthen the national unity and independence of the Iraqi Republic. The leadership of the KDP expressed its gratitude to the Central Committee of the CPSU for their stand in relation to the agreement on a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem and for their valuable help in Iraq's development.

Yours ever -
Nick Livingston

(N. H. Livingston)

Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W. 1.

c.c. Chanceries: Baghdad, Tehran.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

11 AUG 1970

NEQ 112

(Text of Lebanese official statement) The Israeli enemy intermittently shelled the area around Kafr Shuba village in the Hasbayya Sub-District from 08.30 until 13.30 today [7.8.70]. Our artillery returned the fire every time. At 16.20 the enemy Air Force strafed the same area for about 50 minutes. Our anti-aircraft artillery engaged them. The aggression damaged crops in the area. (Beirut in Arabic 18.00 GMT 7.8.70)

Firing in the Golan Heights (Abstract of Israeli report) On 7th August a number of mortar bombs were fired from Syrian territory at Ramat Magshimim in the southern Golan Heights. No one was hurt. The firing at the settlement, which was apparently carried out by terrorists, started at 23.30 and lasted for a few minutes. (Israeli in Hebrew 07.02 GMT 8.8.70)

Firing in the Jordan valley (Text of Jordanian official statements) At 10.50 today [7.8.70] our artillery shelled the sources of the tank gun and artillery fire which the enemy had opened from his positions in the Arab Development Project near Jericho and Zahrat an-Najjar in the southern Jordan valley at our forces on the opposite side. The exchange continued until 11.30. There were no losses on our side (Amman in Arabic 12.00 GMT 7.8.70). At 13.20 today [7.8.70] our artillery returned the enemy field artillery and tank fire opened at our forces from the Arab Development Project and from Zahrat an-Najjar near Jericho in the southern Jordan valley. The firing lasted until 14.45. There were no losses on our side (Amman in Arabic 16.07 GMT 7.8.70).

(Abstract of Israeli report) On the evening of 7th August a number of Katyusha rockets were fired at Menahamiya in the Jordan valley from Jordanian territory. There were no casualties and the fire was returned. (Israel in Hebrew 20.00 GMT 7.8.70)

Katyusha attack in Dead Sea area (Abstract of Israeli report) A number of Katyusha rockets were fired early on 8th August from Jordanian territory at the Dead Sea works area. There were no casualties. (Israeli in Hebrew 07.02 GMT 8.8.70)

Asifah: Sa'iqah joint operation (Text of Palestine Armed Struggle Command communique) An enemy armoured unit yesterday morning [6.8.70] tried to advance toward Jabal ar-Ruwaysah, southern Lebanon, and a combined force of Sa'iqah and Asifah clashed with it, using machine-guns and artillery. The clash lasted for about four hours, during which the enemy fired surface-to-surface missiles into the area. The combined force made the enemy retreat. The enemy radio has admitted that one soldier was wounded. None of our heroic fighters was hurt. (Damascus in Arabic 15.15 GMT 7.8.70)

Fida'i shelling of Lake Tiberias area (Text) Arab Liberation fighters shelled a Zionist settlement near lake Tiberias last night [7.8.70]. Reports said this was the first military operation carried out by the fida'iyyin since the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. (Baghdad in Arabic 09.00 GMT 8.8.70)

Reports in Brief

Nasir's audience President Nasir on 7th August received the Commander of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal Kutakhov, and his delegation. (Cairo in Arabic 20.00 GMT 7.8.70)

Iraqi-Kurdish peace committee meeting (Excerpt) The peace committee - under the chairmanship of the Ba'ath Party Regional Command member and Labour and Social Affairs Minister, Murtada al-Hadithi; and with the Minister of the Interior, Lt-Gen. Sa'dun Ghaydan; the Justice Minister, Aziz Sharif; the Governor of Arbil, Khalid Abd al-Halim; the Governor of Kirkuk, Ghanim Abd al-Jalil; and the Governor of Sulaymaniyah Shukri al-Hadithi as members - resumed its meetings for the second day today at the Haj Umransummer resort. The meeting was attended by the Chairman of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Mustafa Barzani; the Party Central Committee members, Idris and Ma'sud Barzani; and the Party Political Bureau member, Mahmud Uthman. The meeting dealt with the implementation of the 11th March manifesto... (Baghdad in Arabic 21.00 GMT 7.8.70)

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REGISTRY No. 10
12 AUG 1970

July 31st, 1970

(98)

Today's Main News and Trends, Cont'd.

**FLOG ATTACKS NEW RULER OF MUSCAT AND OMAN;
SULTAN QABUS ORDERS 19 PRISONERS BE SET FREE**

Muscat-Oman

A statement in Aden by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Occupied Arabian Gulf, known in short as FLOG, has attacked the new ruler of Muscat and Oman, Sultan Qabus Bin Taimour, who came to power after ousting his father, the former Sultan Said Bin Taimour, who is now recuperating from bullet wounds in London.

The statement, according to the Egyptian news agency, MEN, said that the new Sultan "will be no more than a puppet serving the plans of British imperialism, which has always changed sultans in Muscat whenever it was about to implement a new conspiratorial scheme." The statement declared FLOG will continue its armed struggle against imperialism and "agent sultans."

Initial Measures. Meanwhile, REUTER reported yesterday that the new Sultan of Muscat and Oman had set free 19 prisoners and offered an amnesty for Dhofari rebels as part of the initial measures which he has taken since his takeover of power in the Sultanate. Sultan Qabus has also formed a provisional government council under the chairmanship of sheikh Bareik Bin Hamoud in Salala, in the Sultanate's southern district.

The Dhofari rebels, who are supposed to benefit from the amnesty announced by the Sultan, are identified as members of FLOG. He promised that all those who accepted the amnesty would be treated with kindness and understanding. The Dhofaris have provided the principal opposition to the new ruler's father with aid from the neighboring People's Republic of Southern Yemen. REUTER reported observers as saying that the initial response to this amnesty would be considerable, but the aforementioned statement by FLOG does not show that this is so.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that Southern Yemen will halt the present campaign of subversion and the border troubles in the wild desert and mountain country can be expected to continue, the observers said, according to REUTER.

The 19 prisoners released were freed from the grim Al Jalali prison in Muscat on the orders of the new Sultan. Official Sultanate sources said they were the first batch to be released and other pardons can be expected after review boards had investigated the cases of all prisoners held throughout the country.

KURDISH PESH MERGHA FORCE TO GUARD IRAQI BORDERS

Iraq

PyM
(28)

The Iraqi Revolution Command Council (RCC), the highest authority in the country, yesterday issued a decree forming a new border guard force from the Kurdish irregular army known as the Pesh Mergha, according to an announcement made by the Iraqi Interior Ministry and reported by REUTER yesterday.

The Pesh Mergha is an estimated 20,000 armed men who had fought the Iraqi regular forces in the North of Iraq for some ten years until the March 11th Declaration was reached for settling the Kurdish problem. The Baghdad announcement yesterday said that the formation of the border force came in implementation of the March 11th Declaration, which promised the Kurds autonomy in the areas where they form a majority. The announcement added that the new border force will be governed by the national police law and their salaries will be paid accordingly. It did not, however, mention whether all members of the Pesh Mergha have been enrolled in the new force.

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Kurds away 9

IS IT lasting peace between the Ba'athists and the Kurds in Iraq, or just a mutually convenient truce? Scouts back from Bagdad and points north are more hopeful now than when peace broke out this spring, after 10 years of intermittent sniping and shelling.

The word is that Iraq will shortly have a Kurdish vice-president. He will be Dr Mahmoud Ossman, the Kurdish number two in the fighting days, who played a major part in the six months of negotiations which led to the understanding with the central Iraqi Government. Ossman is satisfied that the Ba'athists are handing real power to the Kurds.

Unlike most Kurds, who are enormous, Ossman is a small, discreet man. Through most of the fighting, he was the only doctor for more than a million tribesmen and he still runs a primitive clinic in Kallalla, in the north. Domestically, Ossman's troubles are with a number of

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Kurds file

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Mahmoud Ossman

subversive factions—some of them, he believes, dissident Kurds, others minor Government officials who benefited politically and financially from the war. "Some of them go to the Kurds and say the Iraqis aren't serious about peace; the others go to the Iraqis and say the same thing about the Kurds."

Externally, Syria is the main opponent of lasting peace; it was the only Arab country which failed to send a telegram of congratulations after the talks. "They are always looking after their own interests," Ossman says. "During the war they blamed the Iraqis for not ending it, and now they attack them for not subduing the Kurds by force."

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THERE are signs that the honeymoon between the Kurds of Northern Iraq the the Baathist regime in Baghdad has become troubled.

Sources close to Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader, said that he was dissatisfied with the way the Iraqi Government were carrying out their side of agreements that were reached on the basis of the Iraqi Government's declarations of March 11.

They said that the Kurdish leader had refused to appoint the Kurdish Vice-President which the new Iraqi Constitution called for, and had threatened to withdraw the five Kurds now serving as Ministers in the Iraqi Government if the Baathists did not carry out their side of the bargain.

In particular, the Kurdish sources said, Mullah Barzani was insisting that the Baathist Revolutionary Command Council appoint four Kurdish governors for Arbil, Mosul, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk districts before he named a Kurd as one of the Republic's four Vice-Presidents.

The sources said the Iraqi authorities had delayed these appointments and were particu-

Kurdish honeymoon with Baathists under strain

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

larly hesitant about carrying out an agreement they had made to appoint a Kurd as Governor of Kirkuk—whose population is mixed—Kurdish, Turkoman and Arab.

Tension between the Iraqi authorities and the Kurds developed during the Kurdish Democratic Party congress in July, according to the sources, when Mullah Barzani allowed a Communist to make a speech criticising the Baathist Government for their failure to create a national front Government and for arresting some Communists and other Leftists.

The Baathist representatives thereupon withdrew from the congress, and the congress did not make the expected disclosure of the name of its nominee for the post of Vice-President.

The sources added that Mullah Barzani and other lead-

ing Kurds were not satisfied also with the new Iraqi Constitution made public a few weeks ago because it included a phrase asserting that Iraq was part of the Arab world.

For the Kurds, it is important that it be made clear that their territory is not part of the Arab world. They feel that this point could become important if Iraq ever entered into a union with other Arab countries. They fear that the Kurdish area might then become hopelessly submerged in the Arab sea.

Another point of criticism of the Constitution made by Mullah Barzani is that it asserts that all the armed forces are under the authority of the Revolutionary Command Council, according to the sources.

The Kurds fear that this provision could mean the undermining of the special status of the remnants of the Peshmerga,

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20 AUG 1970

NEQ 1/2

Kurdish Army that was to have been formed into 12 battalions of 500 men each to be stationed in Kurdistan under a Kurdish commander and to be called a frontier force.

Eight or nine thousand men of the Peshmerga have already been demobilised in accordance with a secret provision of agreements reached after the March 11 declarations.

GUNS DISTRIBUTED

But the Kurds have at the same time distributed 20,000 rifles to loyal peasants who could be quickly mobilised in case of need.

The Iraqi Government's March 11 declaration recognising Kurdish local autonomy halted a war between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government that had been going on intermittently since 1961.

The influence of the Soviet Union is believed also to have played an important role in persuading the Iraqi regime to give up their prolonged effort to suppress the Kurdish national movement. The Russians are thought to see Iraqi Baathist ambitions in the Persian Gulf as a parallel to their own hopes of dislodging Western interests in the area. —New York Times News Service.

Thanks. From 3/18
Mr. Mance. Some good points

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24 AUG 1970

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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

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PUSD (FOR ASSISTANT STAFF)

MOD (D.I.) 24/8

RES DEPT (M.E. SECTION)

MR GORDON KING, U.S. EMBASSY

17 August 1970



Mr. Hinchcliffe. This note
submit
When is the
census expected?
(1/4) 21/8
October

Re: Encl.

New Pers.

The Kurds

Please refer to my letter 1/4 of 27 July. There have been further indications since then of a worsening atmosphere between the Kurds and the government. Al Ta'akhi the Kurdish newspaper in Baghdad has carried several articles critical of the Central Government. In one it specifically accused the government of preventing Kurds from taking up their employment as provided for under the 11 March manifesto. It claimed that the government had based this refusal to re-employ these people on their lack of Iraqi nationality. The article maintained that those who had been refused were in fact genuine Iraqis who had served in the Iraqi Armed Forces at periods in the past and were therefore entitled to full treatment as Iraqi citizens. We believe that those referred to are in fact Fa'ilis who are at least in origin, Iranian.

2. It is not clear from the article just how many have been treated in this way. But the possibility of some connection in the authorities' mind with the coming census is fairly obvious.

3. Another criticism has been the maintenance in existence by the present government of the 1965 National Security Law which although nominally intended as a measure for use only in a state of emergency did also provide formal authorisation for the functioning of the State Security Courts (whether or not a state of emergency was in existence). Al Ta'akhi attacked this Law as an example of an undemocratic measure which did not conform with other more appropriate laws passed since the introduction of the present government. It appealed to the Ba'ath to abrogate the Law and put right the situation of those people still suffering under its clauses. This would seem to refer to those people arrested and tried by the State Security Court.

4. There is widespread speculation that one of the points which the Russians will have impressed on Saddam Hussein during his visit to Moscow is the need for the government to go faster in the implementation of the 11 March manifesto. Parallel with this will probably have been an exhortation by the Russians

P.R.M.Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.

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to the Ba'ath, to implement their own proclaimed policy of instituting a general National Front including amongst others the Iraqi Communist Party. It is widely understood that Barzani has interceded on behalf of the Iraqi communists with the Ba'ath government and that he has declared his intention of standing by his friends (the ICP) who helped him during the Kurdish war.

Yms,
JH

(J. H. Symons)

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REGISTRY No. 10

27 AUG 1970

NEQ 112

UAR, Iraq

102

YES, WHY NO KURDISH VP? Fifty days have now passed on the congress of the Kurdish Democratic Party, which opened in northern Iraq under Mulla Mustafa Barzani on July 1st. One of the main subjects on the agenda of the congress was the election of a Kurdish Vice President to be appointed in the Baghdad Government. But a Kurdish VP, in as far as it is publicly known, has not been named, and the Kurdish congress issued no explanation why.

Now, AL AHRAM has attributed this to what it described as a recurrence of conflict between Barzani and the Baaghist regime in Baghdad. The Cairo paper said that Barzani was not happy with the way the Iraqi Government was implementing the March 11th Declaration for settlement of the Kurdish problem, and that the Kurdish leader insisted that Kurds be appointed Governors of the four main northern districts of Suleimaniya, Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil.

Of course, it would now be in Cairo's interest to see the Kurds turn against the Baathist regime, even though the UAR had constantly called for a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem. Cairo may also be encouraged by the fact that the Kurds have not sided with the Baathist regime in the latter's psychological warfare against President Nasser. AL TAAKHI, which speaks for Barzani, had praised President Nasser shortly after he announced his acceptance of the U.S. peace initiative. Last week, the paper editorially expressed regret over the current inter-Arab split. The state-controlled Baghdad radio and press completely ignored both of AL TAAKHI's editorials.

Differences. The reason perhaps the Kurds have not appointed a Vice President was because of differences with the Government about the Kurdish VP. Some reports, still unconfirmed, said that the Kurds insisted that the Kurdish Vice President should also be appointed in the Revolutionary Command Council, the highest authority in the country. This was not only so that he may participate in the making and execution of higher policy, but so he may also be on equal footing with the other two Vice Presidents, Saleh Mahdi Ammash and Hardan Abdel Ghaffar Ta-kriti, both of whom are members of the RCC. The Baghdad regime was said to have refused the Kurdish request.

Another story --also still unconfirmed-- said that the Kurdish leadership decided to wait on appointment of the Vice President until the Kurdish settlement has been finalized with the assignment of the Kurdish geographical areas in northern Iraq where the Kurds are to exercise the autonomy promised to them under the March 11th Declaration. This is not expected to happen before the end of the year, or even next year. Defining the Kurdish areas will await the population census now to be taken on October 1st.

Cooperation. Official information from Baghdad indicates that all is well between the Kurds and the regime. A week ago, Murtada Al Hadithi, the head of the Iraqi-Kurdish committee in charge of implementing the March 11th Declaration, went up north and met with Barzani. RADIO BAGHDAD reported that they discussed the last stage in carrying out the Declaration.

Last weekend, RADIO BAGHDAD reported that a Government committee in charge of arrangements for the forthcoming census has asked both the Baath Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party to name their representatives in the committee. Last Wednesday night, Sidam Hussein Ta-kriti, the RCC Vice Chairman, represented President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr at a rally held in Baghdad by the KDP marking the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Kurdish party. This was also reported by BAGHDAD RADIO.

ME

DAILY TELEGRAPH

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**KURDS IN CLASH
WITH ARABS**

Seven people have died and 20 were wounded in clashes between Arabs and Kurds in northern Iraq, the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Raya*, which opposes the ruling Iraqi party, reported yesterday.

It claimed that the Iraqi government wanted Arab tribesmen to fight the Kurds, who were granted a kind of home rule earlier this year, as an excuse to withdraw 12,000 soldiers from Jordan.—Reuter.

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REGISTRY No. 10
15 SEP 1970
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Le monde 14/9.

Selon une source
UN GRAVE DIFFÉREND
POURRAIT ÉCLATER ENTRE BAGDAD
ET LES AUTONOMISTES KURDES
Sydney (A.P.). — Selon le
journaliste Al Sayid (de
tendance pro-irakienne), un grave
différend, qui pourrait remettre
en cause l'accord irako-kurde de
mars dernier, a éclaté entre
le commandant du parti Baas (le
pouvoir) et le général Barzani
et ses Kurdes.
Le différend porte notamment
sur le revenu sur le pétrole de
la région irakienne d'occupation.
L'attribution à la vice-présidence
de la République de M. Haidar
Abi Al-Hasan par le Parti Baas
et le Parti Kurde (P.D.K.), le
général irakien refuse de
laisser le commandant d'occupation
de la région à M. Haidar et lui
de son côté refuse. Il lui
refuse également son honneur.

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Mr ~~Marine~~ 15/9

Mr Egerton 15/9

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R.M. Hill

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
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Mr Tunnell (Pain 4) AM 4/10
to Pa.

Prm 4 11/10

13/6
UNCLASSIFIED



BAGHDAD.

28 September 1970.

Dear Peter,

Iraqi Press

We seem to have covered the Iraqi press reactions to the crisis in Jordan fully by telegram this week. However, you may be interested in some items which have appeared in the editorial columns of Al-Ta'akhi which has continued to devote considerable attention to internal Kurdish affairs despite the press of events in the Arab world.

2. Speaking on 24 September about the National Assembly, provided for in the new Interim Constitution, the newspaper says that it will be necessary to implement this provision of the Constitution immediately after the forthcoming census in order to "save the country from the present abnormal conditions and in the light of the new conditions in Iraq after the 11 March Manifesto."

3. On 27 September the newspaper criticised the closure of 110 primary schools in Nineveh (Mosul) Governorate. In the six months that have elapsed since 11 March, the paper says, it would surely have been possible to build sufficient schools for the displaced students. Meanwhile thousands of graduates and teachers were unemployed.

4. Speaking of unemployment in Kurdistan on 28 September Al-Ta'akhi says that the problem remained serious both because of the lack of development in Kurdistan during the fighting and because of the continuing dispute between the government and the oil companies, which has led to a decrease in the take-off of oil. The editorial calls for an early settlement with the oil companies and for the development of local industry in Kurdistan, in order to put an end to unemployment there.

Yan
une

(M.K. Jenner)

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.,
London S.W.1.


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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD



9/10.

3 October 1970

P. R. M.

15/10.

(13/6)

Dear Peter,

105

Criticism of the Government in Al-Ta'akhi

In my letter 13/6 of 28 September I reported briefly on two editorials in the Kurdish newspaper Al-Ta'akhi, one on the closure of schools in Nineveh Governorate and the second on unemployment in Kurdistan. You may be interested in more details of these articles both for the content and as examples of the comparatively moderate tone of Ta'akhi's criticism of the Iraqi Government.

2. The newspaper claimed that 110 primary schools have been closed down in Nineveh Governorate - presumably these closures took place during the period of fighting between the Kurds and government forces. The paper however criticised the government for having done nothing to reopen these schools during the six months that have elapsed since 11 March saying that during this scholastic year at least 5,000 students had been deprived of any education. The writer pointed out that there are thousands of graduate teachers seeking employment and no lack of workmen; walls for the schools could have been built and they could have been roofed with branches if there were no proper roofing materials available. The writer adds that it must be a primary responsibility of the central government to reopen the Kurdish schools; it was his confidence in their goodwill which encouraged him to raise the matter.

3. Speaking the following day about unemployment in Kurdistan Al-Ta'akhi pointed out that the majority of people still worked in agriculture and that the only significant industrial development in the north had been, and was still, the oil fields. The fighting in the north had deprived both agricultural and oil workers of their employment. Also "as a result of the Iraqi Government entering into a dispute with monopolist oil companies" and the consequent reduction in take-off by the latter many Kurdish workers had been dismissed. The authorities should compel the oil companies to restore all Kurdish workers who had been discharged and bring pressure upon them to increase production so that more Kurdish workers might be absorbed. Priority should also be given to the establishment of other industrial or agricultural projects, for example marble, wood,

/cement

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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cement, cigarettes, canning, mining and oil by-products, for which the raw materials were abundant in the north. The tourist potential of the area should also be improved with the construction of modern summer resorts, houses, hotels, casinos and the building of roads and modern villages. It should have been possible, the editorial said, to make a start on these developments in the last six months.

4. The problem of employment as far as it involves the oil companies is of course of special interest to us and I.P.C. is, I understand, making efforts to re-employ as many Kurds as possible. But it is not easy to absorb large numbers of workers quickly into a well-organised staff structure. I.P.C. so far have re-employed approximately 100 Kurdish workmen; however all applications have to be vetted by the local D.M.I. and he has, I understand, so far only passed 400 applications to the company, several thousand are still outstanding.

5. Al-Ta'akhi's editorial columns are frequently devoted to problems of this kind and reflect Kurdish impatience at the slowness at which the 11 March manifesto, so far as it provides for the development of the north, is being implemented. However, the tone of these editorials is noticeably moderate and they generally seek to cajole rather than bully the government into action.

Man

M. K. Jenner

(M.K. Jenner)

CONFIDENTIAL

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELNO 713

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

12 OCTOBER 1970

121000Z

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NEQ 1/2

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 713 OF 12 OCTOBER AND R F I TO BEIRUT,
ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

(101)
SYMONS LETTER 1/4 OF 17 AUGUST : CENSUS.

THE PRESS OF 11 OCTOBER PUBLISHES AN R.C.C. DECISION OF 7
OCTOBER POSTPONING UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE THE CENSUS WHICH HAD BEEN
DUE TO TAKE PLACE ON 26 OCTOBER.

MR. HAWLEY


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Kurds



Reg

27/10
J.D.
2 Bu to PH
5/11/70 (109)

B9 IRAQ: WELCOME FOR END TO EMERGENCY (WITH SATURDAY'S B41)

(BAGHDAD RADIO) JUSTICE MINISTER AZIZ SHARIF, MINISTER OF STATE AND KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY POLITICAL BUREAU MEMBER SALIH AL-YUSUFI AND KDP POLITICAL BUREAU MEMBER DR. MAHMUD UTHMAN HAVE HAILED THE ENDING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN IRAQ AS A DECISIVE BLOW AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION.

AL-YUSUFI TOLD 'AL-THAWAH' THAT THE DECREE ELIMINATES THE CAMPAIGNS OF INTRIGUES AND FALSE RUMOURS BY THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION AND OPENS VISTAS FOR ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL FRONT, SETTING UP THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND CONSOLIDATING THE HIGHEST FORMS OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY.

MF BBC MON 26/10 EM 1229

Detente in prospect for rival Baathists

Beirut, Oct. 16.—The dismissal of Air Marshal Abdel Ghattar Takriti, the Vice-President of Iraq, could lead to an improvement in relations between the rival Baathist regimes in Baghdad and Damascus, Baathist sources said here today.

It is too early, however, to say whether it will lead to an improvement in relations with Egypt. President Nasser's death removed from the Arab political scene the most formidable opponent to the expansion of the Iraqi brand of Baathism.

After being stripped of all his military and civil posts yesterday by his colleagues on the Revolutionary Command Council, Air Marshal Takriti flew to Athens last night.

It was after the fighting between King Husain's troops and Palestine guerrillas last month, when the Iraq contingent in northern Jordan made no move to aid the Palestinians, that an internal power struggle developed in Baghdad.

On one side were the civilian ideologists of the Baath Party who had agitated in vain for an Iraq military intervention in Jordan. On the other was Air Marshal Takriti and a group of Army leaders who were reported to be opposed to such intervention.

The decision not to intervene was strongly criticized by radical Arab quarters abroad and was exploited by Syria in its bitter ideological dispute with Baghdad.

Baathist sources here say that President al-Bakr and the other Baath Party leaders decided to sacrifice Air Marshal Takriti as a scapegoat to appease the civilian wing of the party.

The party, meanwhile, has indefinitely postponed a nationwide census which is considered vital for a permanent settlement of the Kurdish problem.

The Kurds are reported to be demanding that the provinces of Suleimaniya, Kirkuk, and Erbil and Kurdish districts in Diyala and Nineveh (formerly Mosul) provinces should be included in the home rule area.—Reuter.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 2 NOV 1970 NEQ 1/2

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CONFIDENTIAL

(NEQ 1/2)

3 November, 1970

THE KURDS

(107)

In your telegram number 713 of 12 October you reported an R.C.C. decision of 7 October postponing ~~since~~ ~~the~~ the census in North Iraq. Seen from here this looks like the strongest indication yet that the Iraq/Kurdish Agreement of 11 March has run into crippling difficulties. Is this how it appears to you?

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

J. H. Simons, Esq.,
BAGHDAD

mm

CONFIDENTIAL

October 16th NEQ 1/2

R. P. M.
4/11

(1/2)

Today's Main News and Trends, Cont'd

Heikal reported that the disclosure about dispatch of the PLA forces to Jordan was made in a conversation between Nasser and commando leader Yassir Arafat. The latter, the report said, came to see Nasser to tell him of news that the Jordanian army was still attacking the commandos in Amman despite the efforts in Cairo to bring about a Jordanian-commando agreement. Arafat was so angry that he said: "We shall destroy the house on their heads and on ours". President Nasser calmed him, and said what was important then was to bring about a ceasefire because the commando position was not good, and it was important for the commandos to have a breathing spell to regroup their ranks. At this point, Nasser reminded Arafat of the airlift of the three PLA regiments from the Suez Front to Jordan, and of supply by the UAR of arms to commandos.

It will be recalled that President Nasser died of a heart attack twentyfour hours after Arafat signed the agreement with King Hussein for a ceasefire and for reaching a final accord on regulating future relations between the two sides.

Heikal's article today, which was longer than usual, basically talked of President Nasser's last 24 hours in life. During those 24 hours, Heikal conveyed to Nasser a message from the British Government, conveyed through the UK Ambassador, about the release of the commando hijackers in prison in Europe in exchange for the release by the PFLP of the rest of the hostages of hijacked planes. Heikal also was given a message from Nasser to be conveyed to US President Nixon by Mr Donald Bergus, the head of the US Affairs Section in Cairo, who was to go to Riyadh to see Nixon. The message said that Egypt was still interested in peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and that the "din" raised about the UAR missiles in the Canal zone had gone beyond all limits.

* * *

MIDDLE EAST. Initial UAR reaction to the Soviet plan for a settlement of the Middle East is favourable. The plan, the Cairo press coverage said today, seeks to eliminate "completely the consequences of the Israeli aggression of 1967, and provides for guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian people.

There was no other Arab comment. Beirut's pro-Iraq AL KIFAH, in covering news of the plan, noted that the Soviet Union could not ask for more than what the UAR itself is asking -- meaning that the Soviet Union by confining itself to the Security Council resolution of November 1967, was going along with the UAR position which had endorsed the resolution.

Other newspapers today covered news of the Soviet plan on the front-page without comment. The plan, it will be recalled, provides for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory in exchange for an Arab-Israeli peace (see our bulletin yesterday).

AS TAKRITI STRIPPED OF ALL HIS POWERS

Iraq

Split Inside Regime And Ruling Party Confirmed

A serious split appears to have developed inside the Iraqi regime, and inside the ruling Baath Party. One of the regime's top leaders and pillars has been stripped of all power, and appointed to the ceremonial post of ambassador to the Foreign Ministry.

A communique issued by the country's top-executive, the Revolutionary Command Council, declared that Air Marshal Hardan Abdel Ghaffar Takriti, the Vice President, has been stripped of all of his military and civilian posts, that he was retired on pension, and that he was appointed ambassador to the Foreign Ministry.

As usual when Baathists carry out a power upheaval, the measure was taken while Takriti was outside the country. He had gone to Spain on an official mission. He was due back in Baghdad yesterday. In fact, Takriti stopped in Beirut, rejected efforts by local Baathists to keep him in Lebanon, and resumed his trip to Baghdad. He has not been heard from since --and his arrival (or otherwise) in Baghdad has not been reported by RADIO BAGHDAD.

Centres of Power. Takriti was regarded as the second main centre of power in Iraq. The

Today's Main News And Trends, Cont'd

first centre is the ruling Baath Party, led, in the regime, by President Ahmed Al Bakr; Sidan Hussein Takriti, Assistant Secretary General of the Iraqi leadership of the Party and the Deputy Chairman of the RCC; and Lt-General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, the other Vice President. Tension and rivalry between the ousted Takriti and Ammash had been talked about from the first days this present regime came to power in Baghdad in July, 1968, in a coup that toppled the moderate regime of former President Abdel Rahman Arif.

A former Baathist, Hardan Abdel Ghaffar left the party in 1963 when he joined hands with late President Abdel Salam Arif in removing the Baathists from power then. Marshal Takriti always derived his power from the Air Force, where he is said to have large following.

No Surprise. Takriti's removal was not a surprise, as Beirut during the past week buzzed with reports of a split inside the regime and inside the Pan-Arab leadership of the Party. The split was over the failure of the regime to help the commandos during the recent Jordanian crisis. The Baghdad government failed to carry out a promise it had made of placing the 12,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan at the disposal of the commando movement. When fighting between the commandos and the Jordanian army broke out last month, the Iraqi troops in northern Jordan stayed out completely. This has discredited the regime tremendously in the Arab world. This was why the conclusion was drawn that Air Marshal Takriti has been made the "scapegoat" by the Baghdad rulers. They dropped him to try to gain altitude.

On the other hand, Takriti's removal could be part of what appears to be a bid by Baghdad to improve relations with Cairo. Takriti had gone on record with strong statements against the late President Nasser after the latter accepted the US initiative for a Middle East settlement.

Intra-Party Split. As to the reported intra-party split, Michel Aflak, the party founder and Secretary of the Baghdad-based Pan-Arab Command of the Baath Party, was reported to have fallen out with the Baghdad rulers over the Jordanian affair. It will be recalled that after Aflak's cables to Baghdad for help to the commandos brought no results, he ordered all Baathists to go to Jordan to fight on side of the commandos. Aflak resides in Beirut, despite the fact that the leadership he heads is centred in Baghdad.

OTHER PROBLEMS. The Iraqi regime has also been suffering of other problems, some with the Kurds, and some related to the economy. THE ARAB WORLD has reliably learned that a conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government over the administrative future of the oil-rich district of Kirkuk is behind the announcement by Baghdad last week for the indefinite postponement of the population census which had been scheduled for later this month. The Kurds insist on sharing administrative responsibility of the Kirkuk district with the Government, and have accused the Baghdad authorities of a systematic campaign of bringing into Kirkuk as many Arabs as possible with the aim of diluting the Kurdish presence in the district. It will be recalled that the main aim of the census was to determine the size of the Kurdish population and the areas which they form a majority. The March 11th Declaration for settlement of the Kurdish problem promised the Kurds autonomy in areas where they form a majority.

Economic Problems. Other reports from Baghdad talked of large-scale smuggling of currency outside the country. The reports said that this was the reason why the rate of the Iraqi dinar on the Beirut exchange market has dropped to LL7.20, while the official rate is at least LL9.

Travellers from Baghdad have reported a disagreement between the Polish group now in charge of development of the sulfur deposits at Mishraq in north central Iraq and the Government in Baghdad on the cost of equipment required for the project. The Polish team was reported to have asked for American-made equipment and valued it at 30 million dollars. The Government, after doing some checking, found that a US firm which had bid for the same project four years ago (at the time of the Arif regime) offered the same kind of equipment for only 23 million dollars. The Polish answer was that the cost of the equipment was specified in the agreement signed by the Polish and Iraqi Governments a few months ago on the sulfur project. Vice President Ammash had signed the agreement in Warsaw in behalf of the Iraqi Government.

The travellers reported the situation in and around Baghdad tense --and REUTER reports of travellers as saying that there was unusual military movement around Baghdad during the past two days. Press speculations today said that Takriti's insistence to go back to Baghdad spelled trouble, and that he had gone there to defend himself and his position. But how he can do now that he has been stripped of all power, is not known.

Referring ousted officials to the Foreign Ministry has been a standard procedure. The Baathists did the same thing when they ousted Abdel Razzak Al Nayef, the first Premier who shared power with them when Arif was overthrown. On July 30th, 1968, only thirteen days after Arif had been overthrown, Nayef was ousted and later banished outside the country.

R. P. M. M.
12/11

NEQ 1/2 11/11/70

ME/3531/A/13

Iraqi talks with Kurds (Excerpts) The Northern Affairs Minister Muhammad Mahmud Abd ar-Rahman, who is a Kurdish politician, has stated that an ideological dialogue is now going on between the Ba'th Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party on drawing up a charter of national (Arabic: watani) alliance between them, to be a nucleus for an alliance of the progressive internal (Arabic: wataniyah) and national (Arabic: qawmiyah) forces... Abd ar-Rahman added that the promulgation of a national council law and the proclamation of an alliance charter would, if implemented, crown the revolution's march which began with the solution of the Kurdish problem and the historic 11th March proclamation. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 12.55 GMT 9.11.70)

Iraqi Peace Committee's Discussions

Baghdad home service in Arabic 06.00 GMT 9.11.70

Text of report:

The Peace Committee headed by Revolution Command Council member and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Murtada al-Hadithi, met yesterday at the committee's headquarters. The meeting was attended by: Revolution Command Council member and Minister of the Interior, Sa'dun Ghaydan; the Minister of Works and Housing, Nuri Shawis; the Minister for North Affairs, Muhammad Mahmud Abd ar-Rahman; the Minister of Agriculture, Nafidh Jalal Khuwayzi; and the Governor of Nineveh, Khalid Abd al-Halim.

The committee followed up the steps which are being taken to implement the historic 11th March Manifesto. Hadithi announced after the meeting that the legislation for forming the National Council would soon be made and that the legal committee formed by the Revolution Command Council was now preparing the law's provisions. The proclamation of the provisional Constitution had helped in formulating the law. The Constitution had rendered basic starting points and constitutional support for the law and for defining the Council's powers.

Hadithi explained that at the meeting the committee drew up a formula on which agreement had been reached to speed up the formation of the frontier guard to be attached to the Police Department at the Ministry of the Interior. The committee had asked the Ministry to provide all the necessary means to form the guard including decisions, equipment, cadre and services.

The committee also debated the stages so far implemented in the Agrarian Reform Law and the way to put it into effect in the light of the new revolutionary legislation in the Northern provinces which was linked with the implementation of the historic 11th March Manifesto and also with providing a proper living for the citizens.

He continued: The committee also discussed the needs of the Kurdish area for administrative machinery, health centres and construction. Fifty thousand dinars were allocated for internal roads in Dahuk Province in addition to what had already been allocated in the local administration and the municipalities budget.

Hadithi stated in conclusion that the committee had paid special attention to Dehuk Province and said that the debate had been left open until the committee's meeting next week to get the opinion of the ministries concerned.

The meeting lasted over three hours. It is worth noting that the Peace Committee holds its periodic meetings every Sunday in addition to extraordinary meetings when necessary.

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
British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

116

1 Mr Entry
Let us assist to
decision & submit
on that.
(1/4) P.M.H.

Dear Peter,

The Kurds



7 November, 1970.

Thank you for your letter NEQ 1/2.

2. We believe that it is too early to put the construction on the postponement of the census which you do in your letter: certainly the Kurds themselves do not seem to have taken this too tragically.

3. However, I will not attempt at this stage to answer your question substantively since the Ambassador intends to send a despatch on the subject soon.

Yours,
Christopher.

(A. C. D. S. MacRae)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

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R. M. 24/11

(1/12)

Kurdish File

14 November, 1970

Dear Peter,

19/11
National Assembly Law

Saiyid Murtadha al Hadithi, the Minister of Labour, who is also Chairman of the "Peace Committee" for the implementation of the 11 March Manifesto, announced after a meeting of his Committee on 9 November, that the National Assembly Law was now being drafted by a Judicial Committee of the R.C.C. It would be promulgated soon, he promised.

2. On the same day, Mohammed Mahmood, the Kurdish Minister of Northern Affairs and member of Politburo of the K.D.P., announced that talks were now under way between the Ba'ath Party and the K.D.P. with the aim of setting up a National Alliance; "all progressive national and nationalist forces" might later join it. The promulgation of the National Assembly Law and the formation of the National Alliance would be "the culmination of the revolutionary process which had started with the 11 March Manifesto".

3. As you know, the Ba'athi régime have been faced with the dilemma of how, on the one hand, to meet their commitment to the Kurds by forming a National Assembly on apparently democratic lines, while on the other, excluding any parties which might dispute their leadership. It seems likely that the formation of a National Alliance between the Ba'ath and the K.D.P. which other parties might in theory later join, is the formula they have hit on to deal with this difficulty. By billing the so-called "National Alliance" as open to any one who wishes to join, while in practice making the Ba'ath/K.D.P. Alliance the one party able to participate in the National Assembly, they may hope to exclude undesirable elements, such as the Iraqi Communist Party. Such parties might either be unwilling to join the Alliance or could be excluded from it on the grounds that they were unwilling to accept either its policies or the Ba'ath's leading position.

4. The use of the term "Alliance" rather than "Front" is a new departure. What it signifies - if anything - we do not know. It might just be a semantic device to avoid the controversy that has in the past surrounded the possible formation of a National Front.

Yours,
Christopher.

(A. C. D. S. MacRae)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

c.c. Chanceries at BEIRUT and TEHRAN.

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24 NOVEMBER 1970.

NEQ 1/2

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PM
25/11

Murtada al-Hadithi's Talks with Kurdish Leaders

Baghdad home service in Arabic 17.00 GMT 22.11.70

Text of report:

Murtada al-Hadithi - Revolution Command Council member, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, and chairman of the Peace Committee - arrived in Choman district, Arbil Province, this morning. He was accompanied by the following committee members:

Sa'dun Ghaydan, Revolution Command Council member and Minister of the Interior; Nuri Shawish, Minister of Public Works and Housing; Nafidh Jalal, Minister of Agriculture; Muhammad Mahmud, Minister for Construction of the North; and Aziz Sharif, Justice Minister. The Police Director-General, Maj-Gen. Nafi Sulayman, and the member of the Central Committee of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Dara Tawfiq, also arrived in Choman with the committee.

The committee chairman and members were met at Choman airport by the Governor of Arbil, the KDP Secretary, Habib Muhammad Karim, and members of the KDP Central Committee Mahmud Ali Uthman and Shakib Aqrawi.

The Iraqi News Agency correspondent reports that the committee members immediately proceeded to the Salam Palace in Naogirdan, where they were met by Idris and Mas'ud Barzani, members of the KDP Central Committee. The leader of the Party, Mustafa Barzani, arrived shortly afterwards and a meeting was held attended by the Peace Committee Chairman and members, Mustafa Barzani, Habib Muhammad Karim, Mahmud Uthman and Idris Barzani.

After the meeting, which lasted well over two hours, Hadithi announced that the discussions had touched on the situation in the North and the need to accelerate formation of the border guard of peshmarga forces. He added: We discussed giving discharged peshmargas agricultural work, providing the farmers with loans, and implementing the new agrarian reform law. He affirmed in conclusion that our brother Kurds were satisfied with the steps taken and the stages completed by the revolutionary Government in implementation of the 11th March manifesto. He said: They showed us complete understanding, response and co-operation in the various topics discussed at the meeting.

The Peace Committee left Choman district for Arbil this evening.

The KDP leader, Mustafa Barzani, has announced that a number of steps have been taken to implement the historic 11th March Manifesto. He told the Iraqi News Agency: The decision to form a border guard of the peshmargas in the northern provinces is an important step in implementing this manifesto.

Barzani added: Our meetings with the brother Chairman and members of the Peace Committee are important and serve to achieve the Iraqi people's interests.

Dealing with the statement issued by the President of the Republic, struggler Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, on the investment of private sector capital in industry, particularly in the establishment of projects in the North, Barzani said: This comes in implementation and confirmation of the 11th March Manifesto.

RESTRICTED (Covering Confidential)Mr. EgertonRECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

20 NOV 1970

NEQ 1/2

MR. BALFOUR PAUL'S DESPATCH ON THE KURDS

As we had expected H.M. Ambassador in Baghdad has sent us a despatch re-assessing the Kurdish assessment in the light of the decision to postpone sine die the census in Kurdistan. His main conclusion is that the postponement of the census is not symptomatic of a breakdown in the settlement and that, despite various difficulties, the truce is still an effective one.

2. Unless you see any objection I will send a copy of the despatch (there is one prepared) to the printers, under the appropriate pro forma, for printing and general distribution. A second form, attached below, will require your signature and the counter-signature of the Head of Department.

3. I attach a draft letter of acknowledgment to issue from Mr. Evans to Mr. Balfour-Paul and a draft minute from either yourself or Mr. Evans to accompany the despatch to Sir P. Adams and, if it is thought fit, to the PUS.

4. I am also circulating an advance copy to other interested Departments:-

Oil Department,

P.U.S.D.,

Assessment Staff

Research Department.

5. The American Embassy here have shown a great interest in the Kurdish question and as we sent them a copy of Mr. Balfour-Paul's earlier despatch (of 2 April) I recommend that the advance copy of this latest assessment be sent to Mr. Gordon King.

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
20 November, 1970

*PO Paul
24/11*

Mr Evans

X. of 24/11

An excellent despatch. The interpretation of the reason for the postponement of the Census (RESTRICTED §10), and the likely consequences of this (§11) is particularly important. In the circs, I recommend widest possible printing. *NEgerton 21/11*

Mr Egan

JH.

AM issued

Mr Evans has asked of you:-

(a) ~~He~~ will counter on his behalf the pro-Loma rebuttal on adverse copy of the despatch to Sir P. Adams and to the POS and enclose with it the draft letter of thanks/acknowledgment to Mr Balph and to Sir P. Adams.

(b) Supply separately the Blue Minute (a to top copy of the despatch) to Sir P. Adams enclosing him you.

(c) ~~He~~ recommend your advice on "honesty" printing. This should only be used in exceptional circumstances and when action is called for on the substance of the despatch.

PMH

N.E.D.

Mr V. H. H. H.

Regd. M.M.M.

24/x1.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 1 DEC 1970 NEQ 1/2

Iraq

The Kurdish settlement reassessed

SUMMARY

1. Eight months have passed since the March Declaration and a review seems timely (paragraph 1).
2. The problem of enabling, or enticing, the Kurds to share in the policy-making machinery has not been solved. The Kurds are not perhaps greatly interested, on the terms offered (paragraph 3).
3. Barzani's irregulars, the Pish Merga, have not been extensively disarmed or disbanded, though some progress has been made with reforming a few of them into Frontier Guards under the Minister of the Interior, and Barzani depends on diminishing government subventions for the rest. Government forces still almost as numerous in the North as before (paragraph 4).
4. The rival Kurdish irregulars, Talabani's Fursan, have made their peace with Barzani or disappeared (paragraph 5).
5. The nature of the "autonomy" promised to the Kurds remains uncertain but the Kurds prefer to let reconstruction and development of their region get ahead before forcing this or any other major issue (paragraph 6).
6. No effective way has yet been found of harnessing the Kurdish Democratic Party to the Ba'ath (paragraph 7).
7. The government has made genuine progress in other, easier, fields; but the critical Census (which was to decide the boundaries of the autonomous region and the allocation of the Kirkuk oil fields) has been indefinitely postponed, with Kurdish consent, as too explosive. Development is presumably the Kurds' first priority (paragraphs 9 and 10).
8. The government has thus failed so far to resolve the more awkward problems of harnessing the Kurds, and there is little sign of the truce developing into a permanent settlement. But there is no desire for a renewal of hostilities. The Ba'ath still want the K.D.P. as allies; and the truce will continue for the time being (paragraph 11).

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Reference: 1/4

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

13 November, 1970

Sir,

Eight months have passed since a "final" settlement was reached between the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds, formalized in the Revolutionary Command Council's Declaration of the 11th of March, and discussed in my despatch of the 27th of March to your predecessor. The recent postponement of the critical census of Iraq, whose primary purpose was to fix the geographical limits of the regional autonomy vouchsafed to the Kurds, provides a suitable occasion to review the progress made in implementing the Agreement (and clarifying its obscurities) and to reassess the prospects of the settlement sticking.

2. My earlier despatch identified certain features of the March settlement which, either because of imprecision in their wording or because of their inherent intractability, seemed likely to cause trouble. I will begin by taking a further look at the features concerned.

3. The first obscurity concerned the method by which the Kurds would be enabled to share in the exercise of power at the centre. Under the agreement they were to be allotted five ministries in the central government, one of the Vice-Presidencies of the Republic, and proportionate representation in the legislature. Of these three measures only the first has been implemented, five fairly peripheral ministries having been quickly vacated for their benefit and filled. For the failure

/to

The Right Honourable
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, KT, MP,
etc., etc., etc.

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to appoint a Kurdish Vice-President various explanations have been canvassed. Some say that nominations were submitted by the Kurds (i.e. by Barzani, who remains their effective leader) but rejected as unsuitable; others say that Barzani, having reached the conclusion that the holder of the post would prove little more than a powerless hostage in Baghdad, has declined to nominate anyone. As for proportional representation the National Assembly, in which the government were offering to embody it, duly featured in the revised interim constitution announced in July. But its composition was undefined, its powers were circumscribed, and its actual establishment seems no nearer the light of day. The Ba'ath insists that other participants in the projected legislature must accept without question its own leadership. The Kurdish Democratic Party (and other minority parties whom the Kurds cleverly invited to the K.D.P. Congress in June) see little future in walking into the spider's parlour on these terms. If the Ba'athists here are as firmly entrenched as I believe them to be, they would lose little by reframing the invitation in a more appetizing manner. But whether the Kurds would even then be interested is open to doubt. My own view continues to be that of the two central features of the March settlement - participation in central government and autonomy in regional government - it is the latter that principally interests them. There are of course other and perhaps more effective ways in which a minority may influence the central government than by participating in its constitutional machinery.

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4. The second issue left uncertain by the settlement was the future of Barzani's private army of irregulars, the Pish Merga. The fact that the Declaration was silent on so basic a subject encouraged the widespread belief in the existence of a secret protocol governing it. Be that as it may, repeated announcements since March by government spokesmen that the Pish Merga were to be, indeed already were, disbanded, reformed and incorporated within the armed forces of the state in a frontier protection role convinced no one - though some progress in that direction has by now been made. The state of the Pish Merga seems to be as follows. Apart of course from the numbers who must have returned to their civilian occupations, four battalions of Frontier Guards, controlled and paid (like the State Police) by the Minister of the Interior, have been or are being constituted from their ranks; but the main body of them, reported last month by a reliable source to number about 24,000, remain what and where they were, the difference being that Barzani receives funds from the government to pay them, on the basis apparently of a reduction each month of 3,000 men. The government's intention no doubt is to continue this process, forming perhaps additional Frontier Guard units in the course of it, until the Pish Merga are reduced to vanishing point. It sounds optimistic; and even if Barzani has accepted the principle, there is no doubt under whose standard they would all rally again if the truce ended. As of now, in any case, Barzani still has plenty of men under arms; and his heavy weapons, which under the March Agreement, were to be handed

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over "In the final stages of its implementation", are still
in his hands. As for the other side of the coin, there are
still strong government forces in the north as well. Only
one infantry brigade and a few other units have been withdrawn.
The rest are still there, though concentrated in large garrisons
and partly employed (on the hearts and minds principle) on
public works. Thus the situation on the ground has not
radically changed; and in this uneasy balance two recent
incidents suggest that the advantage lies with the Pish Merga.
In Mosul in September the Governor of Mosul arrested a number
of Kurds for political reasons; Barzani's request for their
release was rejected; the Pish Merga fell upon the relevant
police station and forcibly released them; the Governor was
quietly transferred to Basrah. A rather similar incident
followed soon after in Kirkuk, when Barzani's men, dissatisfied
with the local authorities on some trifling issue, simply took
over the latter's offices until they had obtained satisfaction.

5. A further and positive gain for Barzani concerns the rival
Kurdish irregulars, Talabani's Fursan Salahuddin, which had
fought on the Government side during the hostilities. About
their future too the Declaration had been silent - though
Talabani had felt constrained to issue a fulsome telegram of
support for the settlement. In the immediate aftermath the
Government allowed the Pish Merga to pay off a number of old
scores without hindrance. Since then members of the Fursan,
Talabani included, are reported to have trekked off to Barzani
and made their submission. Others may have accepted the

/government's

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government's original suggestion and taken themselves off to the Palestine front, at a safe distance from Barzani. The Talabani problem has therefore solved itself, to Barzani's advantage.

6. A fourth uncertainty concerned the meaning of "autonomy". There can be little doubt that what the government meant by it was no more than a modest measure of regional self-administration: equally little doubt that the Kurds intended it to mean a good deal more. It seems probable, however, that the Kurds are not disposed as yet to start a quarrel on this question. Having accepted, as part of the settlement, the clause by which the exploitation of the oil-fields in Kirkuk "will naturally fall under the jurisdiction of the Republican authorities" in return for an equitable share of expenditure from oil revenues, they are perhaps content to let the Government get ahead with the promised development of their backward homeland before forcing the "autonomy" issue (or any other). In any case, in those areas where the Pish Merga operate, Barzani has never ceased to exercise autonomy of a kind.

7. The fifth of the obscurities mentioned in my previous despatch was the future of Barzani's political organization, the K.D.P. The Party, though it contains leftist elements, has of course no political ideology in the ordinary sense. Its raison d'être is simply to stand up for Kurdish interests as Barzani and his followers see them. If therefore the Ba'athists ever seriously expected the K.D.P. to align itself

/ideologically

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- 6 -

ideologically with themselves, they must have relied on force of circumstance rather than natural inclination. Pious declarations of the identity of the two parties' political outlook are issued from time to time but mean little; and as long as the Ba'ath insist that formal collaboration means formal subordination, the government's various formulae - of which the most recent calls for a "National Alliance" rather than the earlier "National Front" - are unlikely to prosper.

8. All the above might suggest that no progress over the implementation of the March agreement has been made at all. This would be too sweeping a conclusion. To do the government justice such of their promises as could be carried out without serious difficulty have been. The amnesty has been generally observed. The Peace Committee has scuttled continuously hither and thither. Kurdish officials have been appointed where possible. Gestures of various kinds have been made in cultural and educational fields. The Kurdish (Arabic) newspaper is allowed remarkable freedom of expression. Some displaced Kurds have been resettled. Attention has been paid to road building and the development of holiday resorts in the Kurdish hills. A survey of the area's development potential has been conducted with UNDP help, and there has been evidence of the Government scratching around for development funds. Sincere as these gestures may be, however, they hardly go to the root of the problem; and the impatience and suspicion of at least some of the Kurds must certainly have been aggravated by one development in particular, to which I referred in my first

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- 7 -

paragraph, namely the indefinite postponement of the population census. To this I now turn.

9. The census, promised in the March Declaration and subsequently billed for the 26th of October, was of course to be country-wide. But as far as the Kurds are concerned, its purpose was to establish the area in which Kurds predominate and thus determine the boundaries of their autonomous region. The critical issue in this respect concerned Kirkuk and its oil fields. As already mentioned, the Kurds had accepted in March that the exploitation of the oil fields should be under central jurisdiction; they had not accepted their geographical exclusion from the autonomous region. Indeed they have continually and openly declared - even those one meets oneself in Baghdad - that "Kirkuk is our capital". And no doubt they expected a census, if fairly conducted, to prove it. But there was never in my view any prospect of the Government accepting a boundary which left the oil fields on the wrong side. They are well aware that visions of an independent Greater Kurdistan are still entertained by the Kurds. During the summer the Government took, and were seen by the Kurds to be taking, steps to attract the "votes" of the substantial Turcoman population of the Kirkuk governorate. Certainly the Kurds suspected that the census figures would in one way or another be cooked. Some observers forecast that only the oil-less districts in the Governorate would be declared to be predominantly Kurdish. My own guess was that the Kurds might (if they wanted the March agreement to hold) settle in advance for a boundary acceptable to the Arabs in

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- 8 -

exchange for a cast-iron guarantee about the allocation of oil revenues, and that the census would be stage-managed accordingly; or at least that this was the government's calculation.

10. In the event, however, the government faked it. Nobody seems to have been greatly surprised. The Kurds themselves appear undisturbed. Indeed it is almost certain that they consented in advance to its postponement. Their first priority, as suggested in paragraph 6, is probably to allow, or compel, the government to get ahead with the promised reconstruction and development. The census would inevitably have caused a serious clash and, at best, the interruption of this process. Barzani's own comment to a French journalist, published in Jeune Afrique, was that the census would have been of little importance: Kirkuk was Kurdish: nothing could change the facts.

11. So important, however, is the Kirkuk issue to both sides that the Government's failure to resolve it amicably may seem - particularly in view of the lack of progress on other important issues - to put paid to any prospect of the March truce developing into a permanent settlement. It may well be so; and this would not be the first Iraqi Government to try for a permanent settlement and fail. It does not, however, necessarily mean a total breakdown or an early resumption of hostilities. Neither side, by all accounts, wants that (though there are certainly hot-heads on the right wing of Barzani's supporters who might). Nor surely would the Russians, who played an important part in promoting the March Agreement

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- 9 -

and will not want their efforts to be proved fruitless. Whether the Iranians will be content to stand idly by and lose any new opportunity that presents itself of inciting Barzeni into battle with the Ba'ath remains to be seen. So far they do not seem disposed to throw good money after bad. In so far as the Ba'ath themselves are concerned two things should be remembered. Firstly, the Ba'ath genuinely wants allies in this fractious republic. Of their other potential bedfellows the Communists are recognized as too uncomfortable, the Nasserists as positively disinclined, the rest as puny and infertile. The K.D.P. is far the most attractive partner, if only an acceptable contract of marriage could be finally devised. Secondly, it should not be forgotten that the architect of the March settlement (against considerable opposition within the Party) was Saddam Hussain; that his political reputation is linked to his Kurdish policy; and that he is not a man to take a setback lying down. At very least I would expect him to see to it that for the time being the truce continues. I would not venture any longer term predictions.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, Jeddah, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, Moscow and Washington and to the Political Resident, Bahrain, the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, New York, and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, Brussels.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,


(H. G. Balfour Paul)

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PMMA

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~~Mr. Darr~~

~~Mr. Rensick~~


I think the PUS and the British Staff will wish to see the Department's note on this despatch, and read at least the summary of the despatch.

Philip Adams

- 25/xi

Sir P. Adams

- c.c. Mr. A.A. Acland, Arabian Dept.
Mr. R. Ellingworth, Oil Dept.
Mr. Tesh, Defence Dept.
Mr. H.A.J. Staples, PUSD (Assessment Staff)
Mr. Cradock, Planning Staff
Mrs. A. Elwell, IRD
Mr. Bannerman, Research Dept.



Iraq and the Kurds

Flag A
Flag B

When, on 11 March, the Iraq Government announced that it had reached a settlement with the Kurds, it was the Department's assessment that the chances of the agreement developing into a lasting solution of the Kurdish problem were slightly less than evens. Mr. Balfour-Paul's Despatch of 27 March made no predictions in precise mathematical terms, but did spell out the many obscurities and uncertainties contained in the Agreement, any one of which, if not worked out to the satisfaction of both sides, could lead to a renewal of hostilities.

2. Mr. Balfour-Paul has now sent us a further despatch re-assessing the Kurdish Settlement. It is timely and well written. The Ambassador reports that although many of the obscurities of the March Settlement have not, as yet, been clarified and certain provisions of the Agreement, notably a Census to determine the areas wherein a Kurdish majority predominated, still remain unfulfilled, the truce is still in being and there is no sign yet of either a total breakdown or of an early resumption of hostilities.

3. It seems that the Kurds' main priority is to continue to extract as much money as possible from the Ba'ath régime for the development of Kurdistan, an area devastated by the intermittent fighting of past years and in consequence long neglected by the central government. As long as money in appreciable quantities is forthcoming for this work of reconstruction and development, the Kurds will, in the Ambassador's view, probably be content to avoid making a major issue out of any one of the outstanding differences between them and the régime.

4. While rehabilitation continues at a modest pace, and assuming that the Iraqis continue to go some way towards meeting the Kurdish demands for some meaningful share of the autonomy in regional affairs (as well as sinecures in the central government), the truce could continue for some time. One external


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factor which could work towards a breakdown of the settlement would be an increased effort in the Spring by the Iranians to put pressure on the more hot-headed Kurdish elements to resume open rebellion. There are no signs yet that the Iranians are working towards this; as Mr. Balfour-Paul points out in paragraph 11 of his Despatch, they do not seem disposed to throw good money after bad in Iraq. My guess is that they will tackle the problem more subtly, perhaps drawing on ~~the~~ advice from the Israeli experts who have been working with the Pesh Merga.

Flag **C**

5. One anxiety expressed at the time the Agreement was announced (notably by the Permanent Under Secretary in his minute of 6 April on our paper below) was that the Iraqis, having "settled" the Kurdish question, would have their hands free to make trouble elsewhere. It was reasoned, for instance, that they would be able to divert a high proportion of their troops, once tied up in Kurdistan, to Jordan; or alternatively to deploy them in the South where they would be a potential threat to Kuwait (where our defence commitment ends in May 1971), or Iran. However, as the March Agreement still is in effect more of a truce than a settlement, not only have the great majority of Kurdish irregular forces remained in being and under arms, but the Iraqis have so far only felt able to withdraw one infantry brigade and some supporting units from the Kurdish front. This is a situation which is likely to continue for some time, and it suits the interests of all countries concerned with Persian Gulf affairs that it should do so.


(S.L. Egerton)
Near Eastern Department
24 November, 1970


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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 513/70

NEQ 1/2

General Distribution

IRAQ

19 November, 1970

THE KURDISH SETTLEMENT REASSESSED

*The British Ambassador in Iraq to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(Received 19 November)*

SUMMARY

Eight months have passed since the March Declaration and a review seems timely. (Paragraph 1.)

The problem of enabling, or enticing, the Kurds to share in the policy-making machinery has not been solved. The Kurds are not perhaps greatly interested, on the terms offered. (Paragraph 3.)

Barzani's irregulars, the Pish Merga, have not been extensively disarmed or disbanded, though some progress has been made with reforming a few of them into Frontier Guards under the Minister of the Interior, and Barzani depends on diminishing government subventions for the rest. Government forces still almost as numerous in the north as before. (Paragraph 4.)

The rival Kurdish irregulars, Talabani's Fursan, have made their peace with Barzani or disappeared. (Paragraph 5.)

The nature of the "autonomy" promised to the Kurds remains uncertain but the Kurds prefer to let reconstruction and development of their region get ahead before forcing this or any other major issue. (Paragraph 6.)

No effective way has yet been found of harnessing the Kurdish Democratic Party to the Ba'ath. (Paragraph 7.)

The Government has made genuine progress in other, easier, fields; but the critical census (which was to decide the boundaries of the autonomous region and the allocation of the Kirkuk oil fields) has been indefinitely postponed, with Kurdish consent, as too explosive. Development is presumably the Kurd's first priority. (Paragraphs 9-10.)

The Government has thus failed so far to resolve the more awkward problems of harnessing the Kurds, and there is little sign of the truce developing into a permanent settlement. But there is no desire for a renewal of hostilities. The Ba'ath still want the KDP as allies; and the truce will continue for the time being. (Paragraph 11.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

Baghdad,

13 November, 1970.

Eight months have passed since a "final" settlement was reached between the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds, formalised in the Revolutionary Command Council's Declaration of 11 March, and discussed in my despatch of

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27 March to your predecessor. The recent postponement of the critical census of Iraq, whose primary purpose was to fix the geographical limits of the regional autonomy vouchsafed to the Kurds, provides a suitable occasion to review the progress made in implementing the Agreement (and clarifying its obscurities) and to reassess the prospects of the settlement sticking.

2. My earlier despatch identified certain features of the March settlement which, either because of imprecision in their wording or because of their inherent intractability, seemed likely to cause trouble. I will begin by taking a further look at the features concerned.

3. The first obscurity concerned the method by which the Kurds would be enabled to share in the exercise of power at the centre. Under the agreement they were to be allotted five Ministries in the Central Government, one of the Vice-Presidencies of the Republic, and proportionate representation in the Legislature. Of these three measures only the first has been implemented, five fairly peripheral Ministries having been quickly vacated for their benefit and filled. For the failure to appoint a Kurdish Vice-President various explanations have been canvassed. Some say that nominations were submitted by the Kurds (*i.e.*, by Barzani, who remains their effective leader) but rejected as unsuitable; others say that Barzani, having reached the conclusion that the holder of the post would prove little more than a powerless hostage in Baghdad, has declined to nominate anyone. As for proportional representation the National Assembly, in which the Government were offering to embody it, duly featured in the revised interim Constitution announced in July. But its composition was undefined, its powers were circumscribed, and its actual establishment seems no nearer the light of day. The Ba'ath insists that other participants in the projected legislature must accept without question its own leadership. The Kurdish Democratic Party (and other minority parties whom the Kurds cleverly invited to the KDP Congress in June) see little future in walking into the spider's parlour on these terms. If the Ba'athists here are as firmly entrenched as I believe them to be, they would lose little by reframing the invitation in a more appetising manner. But whether the Kurds would even then be interested is open to doubt. My own view continues to be that of the two central features of the March settlement—participation in Central Government and autonomy in regional government—it is the latter that principally interests them. There are of course other and perhaps more effective ways in which a minority may influence the Central Government than by participating in its constitutional machinery.

4. The second issue left uncertain by the settlement was the future of Barzani's private army of irregulars, the Pish Merga. The fact that the Declaration was silent on so basic a subject encouraged the widespread belief in the existence of a secret protocol governing it. Be that as it may, repeated announcements since March by Government spokesmen that the Pish Merga were to be, indeed already were, disbanded, reformed and incorporated within the armed forces of the State in a frontier protection role convinced no one—though some progress in that direction has by now been made. The state of the Pish Merga seems to be as follows. Apart of course from the numbers who must have returned to their civilian occupations, four battalions of Frontier Guards, controlled and paid (like the State police) by the Minister of the Interior, have been or are being constituted from their ranks; but the main body of them, reported last month by a reliable source to number about 24,000, remain what and where they were, the difference being that Barzani receives funds from the Government to pay them, on the basis apparently of a reduction each month of 3,000 men. The Government's intention no doubt is to continue this process, forming perhaps additional Frontier Guard units in the course of it, until the

Pish Merga are reduced to vanishing point. It sounds optimistic; and even if Barzani has accepted the principle, there is no doubt under whose standard they would all rally again if the truce ended. As of now, in any case, Barzani still has plenty of men under arms; and his heavy weapons, which under the March Agreement, were to be handed over "in the final stages of its implementation", are still in his hands. As for the other side of the coin, there are still strong Government forces in the north as well. Only one infantry brigade and a few other units have been withdrawn. The rest are still there, though concentrated in large garrisons and partly employed (on the hearts and minds principle) on public works. Thus the situation on the ground has not radically changed; and in this uneasy balance two recent incidents suggest that the advantage lies with the Pish Merga. In Mosul in September the Governor of Mosul arrested a number of Kurds for political reasons; Barzani's request for their release was rejected; the Pish Merga fell upon the relevant police station and forcibly released them; the Governor was quietly transferred to Basrah. A rather similar incident followed soon after in Kirkuk, when Barzani's men, dissatisfied with the local authorities on some trifling issue, simply took over the latter's offices until they had obtained satisfaction.

5. A further and positive gain for Barzani concerns the rival Kurdish irregulars, Talabani's Fursan Salahuddin, which had fought on the Government side during hostilities. About their future too the Declaration had been silent—though Talabani had felt constrained to issue a fulsome telegram of support for the settlement. In the immediate aftermath the Government allowed the Pish Merga to pay off a number of old scores without hindrance. Since then members of the Fursan, Talabani included, are reported to have trekked off to Barzani and made their submission. Others may have accepted the Government's original suggestion and taken themselves off to the Palestine front, at a safe distance from Barzani. The Talabani problem has therefore solved itself, to Barzani's advantage.

6. A fourth uncertainty concerned the meaning of "autonomy". There can be little doubt that what the Government meant by it was no more than a modest measure of regional self-administration: equally little doubt that the Kurds intended it to mean a good deal more. It seems probable, however, that the Kurds are not disposed as yet to start a quarrel on this question. Having accepted, as part of the settlement, the clause by which the exploitation of the oil fields in Kirkuk "will naturally fall under the jurisdiction of the Republican authorities" in return for an equitable share of expenditure from oil revenues, they are perhaps content to let the Government get ahead with the promised development of their backward homeland before forcing the "autonomy" issue (or any other). In any case, in those areas where the Pish Merga operate, Barzani has never ceased to exercise autonomy of a kind.

7. The fifth of the obscurities mentioned in my previous despatch was the future of Barzani's political organisation, the KDP. The party, though it contains Leftist elements, has of course no political ideology in the ordinary sense. Its *raison d'être* is simply to stand up for Kurdish interests as Barzani and his followers see them. If therefore the Ba'athists ever seriously expected the KDP to align itself ideologically with themselves, they must have relied on force of circumstances rather than natural inclination. Pious declarations of the identity of the two parties' political outlook are issued from time to time but mean little; and as long as the Ba'ath insist that formal collaboration means formal subordination, the Government's various formulae—of which the most recent calls for a "National Alliance" rather than the earlier "National Front"—are unlikely to prosper.

8. All the above might suggest that no progress over the implementation of the March agreement has been made at all. This would be too sweeping a conclusion. To do the Government justice such of their promises as could be carried out without serious difficulty have been. The amnesty has been generally observed. The Peace Committee has scuttled continuously hither and thither. Kurdish officials have been appointed where possible. Gestures of various kinds have been made in cultural and educational fields. The Kurdish (Arabic) newspaper is allowed remarkable freedom of expression. Some displaced Kurds have been resettled. Attention has been paid to road building and the development of holiday resorts in the Kurdish hills. A survey of the area's development potential has been conducted with UNDP help, and there has been evidence of the Government scratching around for development funds. Sincere as these gestures may be, however, they hardly go to the root of the problem; and the impatience and suspicion of at least some of the Kurds must certainly have been aggravated by one development in particular, to which I referred in my first paragraph, namely the indefinite postponement of the population census. To this I now turn.

9. The census, promised in the March Declaration and subsequently billed for 26 October, was of course to be country-wide. But as far as the Kurds are concerned, its purpose was to establish the area in which Kurds predominate and thus determine the boundaries of their autonomous region. The critical issue in this respect concerned Kirkuk and its oil fields. As already mentioned, the Kurds had accepted in March that the exploitation of the oil fields should be under central jurisdiction; they had not accepted their geographical exclusion from the autonomous region. Indeed they have continually and openly declared—even those one meets oneself in Baghdad—that “Kirkuk is our capital”. And no doubt they expected a census, if fairly conducted, to prove it. But there was never in my view any prospect of the Government accepting a boundary which left the oil fields on the wrong side. They are well aware that visions of an independent Greater Kurdistan are still entertained by the Kurds. During the summer the Government took, and were seen by the Kurds to be taking, steps to attract the “votes” of the substantial Turcoman population of the Kirkuk governorate. Certainly the Kurds suspected that the census figures would in one way or another be cooked. Some observers forecast that only the oil-less districts in the governorate would be declared to be predominantly Kurdish. My own guess was that the Kurds might (if they wanted the March agreement to hold) settle in advance for a boundary acceptable to the Arabs in exchange for a cast-iron guarantee about the allocation of oil revenues, and that the census would be stage-managed accordingly; or at least that this was the Government's calculation.

10. In the event, however, the Government faked it. Nobody seems to have been greatly surprised. The Kurds themselves appear undisturbed. Indeed it is almost certain that they consented in advance to its postponement. Their first priority, as suggested in paragraph 6, is probably to allow, or compel, the Government to get ahead with the promised reconstruction and development. The census would inevitably have caused a serious clash and, at best, the interruption of this process. Barzani's own comment to a French journalist, published in *Jeune Afrique*, was that the census would have been of little importance: Kirkuk was Kurdish: nothing could change the facts.

11. So important, however, is the Kirkuk issue to both sides that the Government's failure to resolve it amicably may seem—particularly in view of the lack of progress on other important issues—to put paid to any prospect of the March truce developing into a permanent settlement. It may well be so; and this would not be the first Iraqi Government to try for a permanent settlement

and fail. It does not, however, necessarily mean a total breakdown or an early resumption of hostilities. Neither side, by all accounts, wants that (though there are certainly hot-heads on the Right wing of Barzani's supporters who might). Nor surely would the Russians, who played an important part in promoting the March Agreement and will not want their efforts to be proved fruitless. Whether the Iranians will be content to stand idly by and lose any new opportunity that presents itself of inciting Barzani into battle with the Ba'ath remains to be seen. So far they do not seem disposed to throw good money after bad. In so far as the Ba'ath themselves are concerned two things should be remembered. Firstly, the Ba'ath genuinely wants allies in this fractious republic. Of their other potential bedfellows the Communists are recognised as too uncomfortable, the Nasserists as positively disinclined, the rest as puny and infertile. The KDP is far the most attractive partner, if only an acceptable contract of marriage could be finally devised. Secondly, it should not be forgotten that the architect of the March settlement (against considerable opposition within the party) was Saddam Hussain; that his political reputation is linked to his Kurdish policy; and that he is not a man to take a setback lying down. At very least I would expect him to see to it that for the time being the truce continues. I would not venture any longer term predictions.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, Jedda, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, Moscow and Washington and to the Political Resident, Bahrain, the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, New York, and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, Brussels.

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H. G. BALFOUR PAUL.

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26 November, 1970.

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The Kurdish Settlement re-assessed

I was particularly interested to read your Despatch 4 of 13 November re-assessing the Kurdish Agreement of 11 March. We have recommended that the Despatch be printed as a Diplomatic Report with general distribution.

2. It is encouraging (from the point of view of British interests in Iraq - though perhaps not in the Gulf!) that the postponement of the Census in the North did not mean, as we had feared here, that the Kurds and the Ba'athists were about to be at each others' throats once more. The Kurds seem to have got their priorities right by spoiling the central government for all they are worth in order to enable some of the war damage in Kurdistan to be put right before choosing to make a major issue out of one or more of the numerous outstanding differences which your Despatch so clearly highlights.

3. No doubt you will be keeping a close eye on Kurdistan and will be keeping us posted of any significant developments. I suppose, now that winter has closed in on the North, the area will remain militarily quiet for a bit, as it did even at the height of past troubles. But when spring comes I imagine that there is a chance that the Kurdish hotheads, if they can obtain Barzani's acquiescence, may feel that Baghdad is not coming across fast enough with development funds, and use this excuse to challenge the Ba'ath to a resumption of hostilities. If such natural impatience is coupled with a determined effort by the Iranians to embarrass the Ba'athist régime, then the Iraqis could have yet another Kurdish rebellion on their hands. However we take your point in this connection about the Iranians not wishing to throw good money after bad. It may be that they will concentrate their efforts on stirring up bad blood between the Iraqis and their Arab neighbours to the west.

(Philip Adams)

H.G. Balfour-Paul Esq., C.M.G.,
Baghdad.

C.c. Sir D. Wright, K.C.M.G., Tehran.
M. Weir Esq., H.N. Political Residency, Bahrain.

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23 November, 1970.

The Iraqi news media has given great prominence to the statement issued by the President on the encouragement of private sector investments in the field of industry. In his statement the President said that in working out the current Five Year Development Plan a distinct role has been given to the private sector by which it should seek to realize the objectives of the plan with close cooperation with the public sector. To further this the Revolution has worked to create a spirit under which rules were formulated to issue licences to the private industrial sector, to revise the Board of the Industrial Bank to enable it to guide the private sector, to work out a partnership with it, issue loans to it and study economic aspects of projects to which the private sector could contribute within the national plan.

2. The Planning Board has passed a resolution approving 820 projects for implementation in the first five years, which cover the whole of Iraq. The President stated that the criteria under which the distribution of projects has been made is on a regional balance with emphasis on the under-industrialised Governorates; the industrialisation of the Northern area and the development of its resources in keeping with the March 11 Manifesto; ensuring the use of locally available raw materials to reduce transport costs and thereby production costs and raise production standards on a national level; to activate local industries to make maximum use of local expertise and guidance; to use the financial, technical and administrative possibilities available in the area; to develop them and channel savings towards productive pursuits; to benefit from existing industries to develop new ones; to distribute consumer industries in accordance with consumer demands; to use the agricultural resources to develop agricultural industries.

3. The President said that the Planning Board had decided to form a high level committee which will revise the Industrial Development Law of 1961 to bring it more in line with the Revolution's aim of stepping up in support of the private industrial sector, and to introduce incentives on the basis of geographical distribution.

Export Services Div.,
D.T.I.,
55 Old Bailey,
London E.C.4.

.../...

4. The Federation of Iraqi Industry has announced that it is already contacting the private sector to help them overcome their difficulties. The Ministers of Industry and Planning have both commented on the President's statement. The Minister of Industry said that the plan was a confirmation of the Revolutionary Regime's seriousness in stimulating and backing up the private sector. Technical officials within the Ministry have already started work, and the Directorate of Industrial Development has been authorised to issue import permits, and licence new factories. The Director of the Industrial Bank has been told to give as much cooperation as possible to the private sector.

5. The Minister added that of the 820 projects mentioned in the statement, 91 have already been licenced and that the remaining licences will be issued over the next five years. His staff will be working at weekends and also extra hours to facilitate the private sector with the necessary formalities.

6. The Minister of Planning said that the Chief Economic objectives of the Five Year Plan are to raise national income which can only be done by close cooperation between the public and private sectors. The industry will be channeled to the underdeveloped Governates to avoid the current trend of over proliferation and to set up a counter emmigration to these under developed areas.

7. In working out the distribution of projects, due attention has been given to industrialising the Northern area and tapping its resources, in keeping with the aims of March 11 Manifesto.

(A. Arnold)

cc.s. Mrs. K. P. Davies, C. R. & E. Dept.,
E.C.G.D.,
Near Eastern Dept. F.C.O.

Cutting from Newsweek 7 December 1970.

Musta Barzani to see not at all a local article -
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energetically." As long as Tito lives, Yugoslavs will no doubt heed his warning. But a Croat newspaper editor reminded me: "In the past we have underestimated the forces of nationalism, thinking the liberation had solved all our problems. We still tend to forget that people who have fought for and preserved their national identities for more than 1,000 years refuse to let national feelings die."

IRAQ:

The Kurdish Truce

In all of human history perhaps no people have fought more tenaciously to preserve their separate identity than the Kurds. Over the centuries, the Kurds have battled the Assyrians, the Persians, the Romans, the Turks and the Arabs. As a result of this ethnic assertiveness, some 10 million Kurdish tribesmen still inhabit their ancestral home—a crescent of jagged mountains that runs along the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates from the eastern border of Turkey through northern Iraq to the western reaches of Iran (map). For a contemporary view of these primordial nationalists, NEWSWEEK's Loren Jenkins recently traveled to northern Iraq, where he visited Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish guerrilla chieftain who in nine years of war has fought the superior Iraqi Army to a standstill. Last week, upon his return to Beirut, Jenkins filed this report:

For the past eight months, Kurdistan has been at peace. Last March, in an effort to end the costly war that Barzani and his partisans had waged against successive Iraqi regimes, the government in Baghdad offered the Kurds some seemingly significant concessions. But despite the tenuous cease-fire that has reigned since then, the scars of battle still mark the Kurdish countryside. In the foothills outside the town of Erbil, I saw villages that had been leveled by Iraqi artillery and air strikes. I also saw rusting hulks of Iraqi Army trucks shot up by the Kurds, mementos of Baghdad's fruitless efforts to bring the tribesmen to heel.

For a while, as I made my way northward along Highway 3, the Iraqi Army and its Soviet T-34 tanks were often in evidence. But not far out of the village of Shaqlawa, the Baghdad government's presence shrank to insignificance. I was now in "Barzani country," a land of soaring, snow-capped peaks, rushing streams and narrow valleys neatly terraced to allow wooden plows drawn by oxen or donkeys to till small farms of wheat and tobacco. The farmers were dressed in fringed turbans and floppy trousers, and members of Barzani's fabled guerrilla army, *Pesh Merga* (meaning "forward to death"), were everywhere evident. Their bandoliers were still heavy with bullets, and their much-prized, long-range rifles were still at their sides.

For if years of war have made Barzani a living legend, they have also made him

supremely wary. Though the 66-year-old warrior chief professes to believe that the current peace with Baghdad will last, his instincts do not permit him to let down his guard. Barzani never leaves the mountains to negotiate with the Iraqi regime of President Ahmed Hasan Bakr; he always sends emissaries. For security reasons, he shifts his headquarters almost as frequently as he did in wartime, and this winter he has settled in Delman, a tiny, 25-hut village hard by the Iranian border. There Barzani holds court, consulting with Kurdish chiefs and political leaders. And there—in an adobe hut draped with Persian rugs—I was brought to see him.

A burly, impressive man with gray hair showing under his massive red and white turban, Barzani (who once lived in exile in the Soviet Union) ridiculed reports



Mehmet Riber—Transworld Feature Syndicate

that his army receives extensive Russian military aid. "To say that we have been helped by the Soviet Union or any other power is nonsense," he declared, puffing on a handrolled cigarette. "This is simply an excuse raised [in the West] in order not to help us. Look at Egypt and Israel. Those are nations helped by other powers. When you look at Egypt you see Soviet rockets and when you look at Israel you see American Phantoms. Here, the only foreign weaponry you see are the Soviet arms of the Iraqi Army which has been fighting us."

Sabotage: Although Barzani seems sincerely convinced that the Baghdad government wants peace, he did not try to minimize the problems that lie ahead. "Of course there are always obstacles working against us," he said. "We recognize this. Many people would like to sabotage peace because war worked to their advantage... These are some of the big people in the government who were war merchants living off the struggle, some of the military and even some of our own *josh* [traitors], whom the

government paid to fight against us."

That there are major obstacles to continued peace is, in fact, an understatement. For as Barzani is keenly aware there are many Iraqi Government officials who have no intention of relinquishing a share of power to the Kurds. As part of last March's agreement, five Kurds have already been named to the Cabinet in Baghdad. But the true seat of power in Iraq is the fourteen-member Revolutionary Command Council—and so far the ruling Baathist Party has refused to name a single Kurd to that body. Under a new constitution, Barzani has the right to nominate a Kurdish Vice President, but he declines to do so until the Vice President is given real power, such as a seat on the revolutionary council. Then, too, there is the problem of Kirkuk, the center of a rich, oil-producing area from



Penza & Norhovia

Deep in his remote mountain kingdom, Mustafa Barzani (left) holds sway

which the Iraqi Government draws revenues of more than \$500 million a year. Barzani insists that Kirkuk is Kurdish and that the Kurds must have a share in that revenue. The Baghdad government, however, disputes this claim. And although the regime agreed to take a census to see which ethnic group is in the majority in Kirkuk, it has postponed the count until some unspecified future date.

Faced with these "obstacles," Barzani has adopted a wait-and-see attitude. He has also grown extremely cautious in his public utterances. Although he once fervently supported the idea of an independent Greater Kurdistan—incorporating large parts of Iraq, Iran and Turkey—he has recently tried to disassociate himself from that improbable dream. All he wants, Barzani insists, is real local autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq—plus a share of the power in Baghdad. And if he does not get it? "Many of our men have returned to their farms," the old chieftain told me, gently stroking his dagger. "But if we are attacked again, it would be very easy to remobilize."

B.B.C. WORLD TV/CAST.

ME/3558

122

of 12 December 1970.

Shooting of Kurdish Democratic Party Member

Baghdad home service in Arabic 05.00 GMT 10.12.70

Excerpts from press review quotation of report in 'Ath-Thawrah':

On the night of 6th to 7th December a car of the Kurdish Democratic Party was the subject of a sinful attack in which a KDP Central Committee reserve member, Hamid Barwari, was wounded. This incident - which has provoked the anger and condemnation of the two allied parties, the Ba'th and the KDP, and of the Arab and Kurdish masses of the people - is another evil episode in the series of attempts by imperialist

and reactionary quarters and the agent and suspect enclaves to lay mines on the path leading to the implementation of the great 11th March manifesto, the building of national unity and the strengthening of the alliance between the Ba'th and the KDP.

The two parties - co-authors of the 11th March Manifesto - have been aware from the beginning of the designs of the imperialist, reactionary and suspect quarters, whose hopes and interests collapsed when the Manifesto was proclaimed. They also understood that those quarters would not stand idly by while our people, the two allied parties, and the revolutionary authority forged ahead to implement the Manifesto. The two parties also realised that these quarters would try by all means, including this depraved method, to hamper the progress of the triumphant national unity procession...

The attempts of the imperialist, reactionary and suspect gangs will constantly be crushed against the massive wall of the alliance between the Ba'th Party and the KDP, firm faith in national unity, and the (?great) 11th March Manifesto. The watchful and efficient revolutionary departments, which have given the agents and plotters unforgettable lessons in the past, will not allow the suspect and agent cliques which master-mind such actions to escape severe and decisive punishment.

Po. RMM

17/12

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
Mr Hinchcliffe

BRITISH EMBASSY gossip is the same as Baghdad's!

BAGHDAD

Mr Egerton at 18/12

(origin of the rumors of an attack on Idris Barzani) ?
then enter



Copies to 110

done RES DEPT (me)

18/12 PUSO (ASS. STAFF)

1/4

the reg

& P. HMM

18/12

Dear Sir,

You will have seen a report in the Arab World of 10 December, drawn from Al Thawra, of an attack on the Kurdish leader, Hamid Barzani, in which he was seriously injured.

2. The story as we heard it was that the attack took place on the night 6/7 December outside the Opera Hotel in Baghdad where Barzani's son Idris had been staying. The attack was said to have been aimed at Idris Barzani himself, but unknown to the assailants he had left Baghdad that afternoon. The Kurdish newspaper Al Ta'akhi has now printed this story.

3. It is difficult to decide who were the perpetrators of this attack and why they did it. You will have seen that Al Thawra ascribes it to Imperialist and Reactionary agents; Al-Ta'akhi also took this line and linked this attack with an earlier one by armed men on the K.D.P. headquarters in Mosul. The purpose of these attacks was said to be the disruption of friendly relations between the government and the Kurds. Neither Al-Thawra nor Al-Ta'akhi spells out who exactly these "Imperialist and Reactionary Agents" are. Possibly the Iranians are the most obvious candidate.

4. Suq gossip has it that the attackers were Talabanists; it is difficult however to see why the Talabanists should have laid themselves open to retaliation so blatantly, they are at present in a weak position politically and a considerable number of them are still held by Barzani as hostages; Talabani himself has, as you know, recently made his submission to Mulla Mustafa. It is conceivable, I suppose, that the attack was carried out by an extremist fringe of the Talabanists on their own initiative. Another possibility is that the attack was connected with inter-tribal fighting in Kurdistan, the details and scale of which have not yet been confirmed. However, this is pure speculation; even our K.D.P. contacts profess to have no idea yet who was behind the affair.

with lot of Taqiya

Yours
M. K. Jenner

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

copied to: Chanceries, Beirut, Tehran, Ankara.

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


British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

(124)

(1/4)

11 December, 1970.



Dear Peter,

The Ambassador has suggested my sending you the enclosed copy of his record of a recent call on the Kurdish Minister for Northern Affairs.

2. In connexion with paragraph 4, we are proposing to invite the interest of OXFAM. Tours in the Kurdish region which Donald Hawley and David Barwell have recently made amply confirm the poverty and discomfort in which the Kurds are living after 10 years' hostilities. Obviously OXFAM could not produce the sort of sum Gulbenkian contributed for reconstructing a village; but, as the Minister observed to the Ambassador, gratitude for small kindnesses is perhaps more keenly felt than gratitude for large ones. And we do not want the Russians (and Gulbenkian and the Spaniards) to stand out as their only overt benefactors. ?

3. Incidentally, you might like to know that during his trip, David Barwell managed to have a long interview with Mulla Mustafa himself. He has promised to write a sketch of his impressions of the Mulla's personality and health for us to pass on to you.

Yours,
Christopher.

(A. C. D. S. MacRae)

*Mr Egerton to rel
then reg
Sunder.*

*P. M. H. b
17/12*

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Copy interesting
letter & minute to*

*done 18/12 Mrs Elwell 1 RD;
Mr Fullerton, NE Dept 18/12
Mr Foster Mr Jordan; ODA.*

تقوین العمل

Mr. Hawley and I were received by the Minister for Northern Affairs (which appears to be his proper title) yesterday for about an hour and a quarter. Mohammed Mahmoud is a quiet-spoken Manchester B.Sc. of, I should say, 37. Though not a powerful personality in an aggressive sense, he struck me as having considerable strength of character and it was impossible to doubt his sincerity. He also disclosed an engaging sense of fun. If, as Mr. Hawley was informed in the North, he is the Kurds principal agent in the government, it is an acquaintance worth cultivating. The following is a summary of what he said, set out under headings and not in the order he said it.

He spoke earnestly of the nostalgia (sic) the Kurds felt towards Britain. He himself admired British democracy above all things and felt that Britain still had an important role to play in this country. He quoted an obiter dictum of Barzani's "that other people complain about having been colonised by Britain. We complain because we were not".

The Ministry for Northern Affairs had, he said, executive functions but he hoped to have it reconstituted as a co-ordinating authority for the development of the North, in some form of association with the Ministry of Planning. He mentioned more than once the clause in the March 11 Agreement which he said entrusted matters of reconstruction to his Ministry - which he had been able to quote to other Ministries when his financial jurisdiction was called in question. (I presume he was referring to paragraph 7(a) of the Declaration which reads: "A committee of experts shall be setup to supervise the general development of the Kurdish area and to arrange compensation for the set-backs of recent years. An adequate budget is to be allocated for this purpose. The committee in question shall come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Northern Affairs".)

After 10 years of fighting and retrogression the Kurds had neither food, nor clothing, nor housing. Some 30,000 houses had suffered in the troubles in 7/800 villages. So far the authorities had built or restored only 3,000 houses. There was an enormous amount to do. Could not Britain take on the reconstruction of a village to demonstrate their interest and serve as a perpetual memorial. Gulbenkian had contributed £70,000 in this way for reconstructing a village. The money had been paid direct to his Ministry, presumably by virtue of Clause 7(a).

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- 2 -

5. Development

Two surveys were underway:-

- (a) The Spaniards had undertaken to survey tourist potential and ancillary services and had offered a \$18,000 loan as part of the deal.
- (b) The Italians were to survey and refurbish existing tourist facilities in four specific areas.

6. They (the term he used throughout to refer to the government) were not doing enough financially - though perhaps the forthcoming budget would help. They had swallowed the whole of the I.P.C. loan of £20 million in the Ministry of Defence to cover the deficit on pay and allowances. He hoped that friendly countries would extend financial help for the development of the North, though it would have to be channelled through the central government.

7. As regards development projects in the private sector, about which we asked him, he undertook to send us a copy of the as yet unpublished list of those in the North, so that we could draw the attention of British business houses. He subsequently added that, since the subject fell strictly within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry, it would be better if we discussed it with Taha al Jezrawi - or (he added as an after-thought) Ammash "who is really in charge of it all". Whether he will actually send the list remains to be seen.

8. Technical Assistance

The Russians had awarded 20 scholarships to the K.D.P., without reference to the central government. Could not the British Council, he asked, do something similar? We explained the channels through which both the British Council and ourselves (representing O.D.M.) had to work. He seemed interested in the possibility of O.D.M. scholarships for Kurdish students and hoped we could set something in motion with Sirriya al Khoja. He agreed that agriculture, forestry and development planning would be useful fields for post graduate training. (We should look into the possibility of Paul Howell's Institute at Cambridge taking a Kurd or two.)

9. Oil and the I.P.C.

The Kurds did not expect to control Kirkuk oil production or obtain a fixed percentage of the government take, even though the oil came from Kurdish territory. They stood for a countrywide application of oil revenues on a population basis. But could not the I.P.C. assist the Kurds direct? He mentioned in particular re-engagement of Kurds discharged because of government pressure during the troubles. Under what he referred to as Al-'Ahd Al-Mushtarak many Kurds had been paid off, but they should be taken back into service, even if this meant partial repayment of their gratuities.

10. I subsequently enquired about this from Mr. Hahn. He told me

/that

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- 3 -

Cf. Lons Hall &
that all Kurds who had left voluntarily to fight for Barzani had been re-engaged on request: they numbered only about 40. As for Al-'Ahd Al-Mushtarak, he explained that this referred to the MCRS (Mutual Consent Resettlement? Scheme), under which 2,346 Kurds had been laid-off at government request and replaced by Arabs. They had all accepted fairly generous gratuities; they had no claim to re-employment, and could not be taken back without sacking Arabs, though he has been doing what he can. It might be worth Mr. Hahn paying a call on the Minister when he returns from leave.)

11. Government Policies

The Kurds continued to be dissatisfied by the way the government were keeping them out of power at the centre. They were not interested in a Vice Presidency until the powers of the post were adequately defined. The holder must amongst other things be a member of the R.C.C., which was where the power lay. Lower down many more Kurds should be given positions of authority in the Civil Service; those who had been appointed since the settlement were given inferior positions under incompetent Arabs. But despite these dissatisfactions, Mohammed Mahmoud (who is no Ba'athist) insisted that the Kurds recognized they were getting a better deal from the Ba'athist régime than from any previous revolutionary government, and were determined to make the best of it.

12. He considered it essential that a Council of Ministers should be reconstituted, since the present lack of inter-ministerial consultation reduced the process of government to chaos. It would only take them half an hour to amend the Constitution. However, as a first step they could, and probably would, hold regular meetings of Ministers under the chairmanship of the President or Vice President, without amending the Constitution.

13. As regards plans for a National Assembly, progress could only be made through an alliance between the Ba'ath and the K.D.P. and initially the Assembly would have to be appointed. There was no hope of the Ba'ath accepting elective representation. The Kurds believed in it and practised it in their own affairs as best they could. Ultimately a nominated parliament might lead to an elected one.

14. The Minister hoped we would keep in close touch. I think he meant it.

(H. G. Balfour Paul)
9 December, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

Make over
CONFIDENTIAL

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AP 31/12
Mrs. Elwell (Information Research Department)Mr. ~~Ducker~~ (Financial Policy and Aid Department)ASSISTANCE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF KURDISTAN

--- I am sure you will be interested to see the attached copy of a letter from Mr. MacRae covering a record by Mr. Balfour Paul of a recent call on the Kurdish Minister for Northern Affairs.

2. We are not altogether happy at the Embassy's suggestion that Oxfam should be invited to interest itself in the reconstruction of devastated areas in Kurdistan. You may have ~~some~~ ^{different} views of Oxfam but it seems to me that sometimes they seem to get their politics and their charity entangled to the embarrassment of HMG and to the detriment of the would be beneficiaries. The temptation to meddle in local Kurdish politics may be too strong for Oxfam and I would have thought that we should attract a less politically orientated charitable organisation. However this is very much a personal view and I would be grateful for any comments or suggestions that you may have.

3. I would also be grateful if FPAD could advise on this problem and perhaps suggest a few organisations worth approaching. "War on Want" did a good job in Jordan, perhaps they would be responsive to this plea from the Kurds.

4. I am sending copies of these papers to Oil Department (to see especially paragraph 9 of Mr. Balfour Paul's record) and to ODA who may wish to comment on the technical assistance aspects of Mr. Mahmoud's request.



(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
Near Eastern Department
18 December, 1970.

Copied to:

Mr. Tunnell (Oil Department)

Mr. Frost (Overseas Development Administration)

*Sent with copies of f124**12/12*

OXFAM is, in our view, an
ill-run organisation, desperately keen to
be trendy, and inferior at all points
to War on Want, but not subversive
or even consistently "political".

R Thomas
(120)

31.12.70

Mr. Hutchcraft NED

My impression of OXFAM's headquarters staff is that
they are brash, publicity seeking and image-conscious.
But they also have the merit of being adventurous and willing
to tackle unusual jobs, ~~possibly~~ (possibly with their image
in mind, but not necessarily). I know little about their
field workers, except that one in East Pakistan relayed his
H.A. that British official advice should be ignored. This may
be only an individual's trait, but it could be embarrassing
(-say)

if it happened in Kurdistan.

2. War on Want and Christian Aid headquarters staff
appear more cooperative, but again I have no knowledge
of their field operations.

3. I attach a copy of Christian Aid's latest available
annual report. They helped with housing in Jordan
and Syria.

E. G. DUCKER 11/11

E. G. DUCKER

Mr. Heinrich ~~He~~ Reg ^{NEQ 1/2} Confidential
 & submt ~~in~~ ~~TEMP~~ JACHT
 SD. Mahd. Mahmud ~~AMM~~
 18/12

This is a most interesting letter or Minute. It might usefully be seen in the course by Mr Evans or Sir P. Adams, not to mention Oil Dept.

But I am concerned that
the Embassy are proposing to invite
the interests of Oxfam in Reconstruction.
Pl. get an office view (? IRD)
on Oxfam's politics now; I feel they
wd. inevitably meddle in local politics

& get us in bad with
the central govt, possibly
deliberately but in any
case unnecessarily.

There are other charitable
organisations - eg. I think
"War on Want" - who abjure
politics & do just as good
a charitable work. Pl. investi-

gate & JFT reply.

R 18/12

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Assessment STAFF Captain's office
(PUSD)

M.O.D. (Sg. Leader J. Bishop)
F.P.D. (Mr Willson)

Report on a Tour of the Northern Governorates by the
Commercial Counsellor on 21-28 November

Mr Hindcliffe.
Enter KUNDI file 132/12
Miss Secretary R.E.
Mr Ferguson
of min

Mr. Hindle. 20
 II Enter K. A. I. F. 132/12
 Miss ~~Secret~~ R. E.
 Mr. Egerton of 2712
 Governorates by the quarter
member
 A. B. K. interates
 Governorates with
 the following
 1, Mosul, Dohuk,
 P. M. Humble
 14/12

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY N. 10
my wife
places
Sarsang
NEQ 1/2 KIRKUK
I.F.C.

Po pmmn or interals

126

We called on the staff of Parsons Power Gas who are all in the Kirkuk Hotel. There are at present 18 of them. There are two wives and two children - a boy of 11 and a girl of 9. There are considerable difficulties over the education of the children, particularly as the IPC expatriate school is not permitted to take them. (Mr. Gillan told me that he would like to do so, but it would raise impossibly awkward precedence for him.)

I called on the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Hassani al Hadithi, who is a close relation of Murtadha al-Hadithi and Anwar and Nasser al-Hadithi. It transpired that the following projects are being considered by the private sector in Kirkuk:-

- (a) A small flour mill (cost approx. ID 200,000). It would be a joint venture with the public sector. This was still at the project stage and was being handled by the governorate.
- (b) A factory for wire wool.
- (c) A small plastics factory.
- (d) A factory for carpenters tools and making picture frames.

Mr. Hadithi

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Mr. Hadithi asked whether we could supply:-

- (a) A catalogue of contractors plants.
- (b) An up-to-date copy of the Arab Buyers Guide to British Industry.

I promised him what assistance we could give and suggested that his members might call at the B.C.O. in Baghdad.

Muhafiz

I called on the Muhafiz, Sa. Ghanim Abdul Jalil. We had a very friendly conversation.

He said that relations between Iraq and H.M.G. and the I.I.C. were now much improved, though the group companies did not give Iraq as much as they gave to other countries such as Iran. He then alluded to the demand made by the Minister of Oil on 22 November for a 55%/45% sharing arrangement and a 9 cent per barrel increase for Basra crude. Local relations with IPC were very good though, when Mr. Gillan had taken over as General Manager, he had advised him not to be "Scotlandi". He felt however, that IPC had co-operated more with his predecessor than with him over "gifts" to the governorate. He then described a tangle into which IPC had got itself over presenting a Barber Greene asphalt plant and said he hoped that Mr. Gillan would be able to sort this out (Mr. Gillan later explained the problem. IPC Kirkuk had been advised by their London office that a Barber Greene plant could be obtained for some £20,000 but it later transpired that this was useless without a further plant costing about the same again. They had then looked for a second plant and given the Muhafiz the alternative of this, costing £17,000 or payment of £10,000 for some other project. Mr. Gillan thought that the companies should be generous over this.)

The Muhafiz said he wanted quotations from British companies for buses taking single deck passengers. He had ID 100,000 to spend from his own funds.

SULAIMANIYAH

Muhafiz

I called on the Muhafiz, Shukri al-Hadithi, who said he had been in Sulaimaniyah for 10 months but would shortly be replaced by a Kurd. (I was told by a friendly Kurd in the waiting room that Sulaimaniyah was 100% Kurdish except for the officials stationed there. Improvements were being made over official appointments e.g. the police there were now commanded by an ex-Pish Mergah officer.)

Mr. Hadithi said that he thought ID 40-50 million would be allocated for development in Kurdistan, mainly summer resorts and roads.

/President of the University

President of the University

I called on Dr. Mohammed Saleh, the President of Sulaimaniyah University. He was extremely pleasant, friendly and urbane, and I invited him to come and see us in Baghdad - which he said he would do. He was educated in the U.S. at Chicago and his disciplines are Social Science and History. He said the University now had a thousand students but was struggling for more money. He had on several occasions found that President Bakr had been helpful over this. He needed immediately ID 2 million for University buildings but only ID .8 million had so far been allocated. The University was receiving an annual income of ID 100,000. At present there were only three faculties:- Engineering, Basic Science and Agriculture, but Arts and Letters, including English would be added in 1971 and Medicine in 1975. The University badly required:-

- (a) Books and equipment (I told him that we were shortly helping over books).
- (b) Lecturers from the UK.
- (c) Fellowships (in this connection he asked for the British Council to give him direct indication of fellowships available as well as sending details through the Ministry of Higher Education.

Cigarette Factory

I called on the Director General, Shafiq Ahmed al Shellabi who is also the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce. He immediately claimed that he had been 10 years with the Kurdish revolution and during this period he had lived in Kirkuk liaising between Arabs and Kurds. He took over the factory in April 1970 having had previous experience in the Tobacco Monopoly in Sulaimaniyah - his home before the Kurdish troubles. He was hopeful about the future and about increased development in the North. Both Arabs and Kurds had had enough blood-shed and saw no point in continuing a state of affairs which was bad for both sides. There had been no development in Sulaimaniyah in the last ten years.

We were shown round the Cigarette factory by the Director General and a pleasant Kurdish Technical Manager, called Aziz, who was educated at Leeds University. The factory is equipped with German machinery, mainly West German but there are a few East German machines. The Director General and the Technical Manager said that the West German product was superior to the East German and was lasting much better. A line of credit for ID 10,000 had recently been opened for wrapping machines to be supplied by Molines.

/ERBIL

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ERBIL

Muhafiz

We were met at Erbil by Mr. George Booth, who is the UNDP forestry expert there. He is manager of the UNDP/F.O Forestry Research, Administration and Training Project. He took me to the Governorate, having made an appointment for me to call on the Muhafiz. In fact the Muhafiz was not there, having gone off at short notice with the Ministers of Agrarian Reform, Agriculture and Irrigation to look at a potential agricultural scheme at Mukhmur. We therefore called on the Deputy Muhafiz, Kanabi Aziz Dizai. He said that he was a cousin of Muhsin al-Dizai and was himself a Kurd from Erbil. He is a very rotund little man with a pate as bright and shiny as marble. He explained that he was a career administrative official. When the trouble started in the North had had been transferred to Nasiriyah and latterly had been given a sinecure in the civil defence department in Baghdad.

Mr. Dizai explained that the Muhafiz, like himself, was a Barazanist Kurd. In fact all the senior officials in Erbil were now Kurds, although the Director of Security was "one of our allies, a Ba'athist". Erbil, he claimed was 99% Kurd.

Mr. Dizai said that ID .9 million had been allocated by the Central Government for rehabilitation i.e. to rebuild bombed houses etc. The Erbil governorate had the largest share because the damage had been greatest there. The Kurds were glad that the fighting had now ended but they wanted:-

- (a) Much more money for development. They would press hard for it.
- (b) A bigger share in the Central Government in Baghdad. There were not sufficient ministers and more under secretaries were required in the ministries in order that Kurdish interest should be properly taken account of. The Central Government had offered the Vice Presidency to Idris Barazani but Mulla Mustafa did not want this nor did he want any member of his family to take up the appointment. What the Kurds wanted was the vice presidency, not one of several vice presidents' posts. A great deal more remained to be done and the Kurds were keeping part of the Pish Mergah in being as a precaution.

Mr. Dizai, referring to Sheikh Mahmoud, said that Britain had not been friends of the Kurds in the past. The Kurds deserved more help and he hoped that this would now be more forthcoming. For the present, the Kurds were only aiming at self government within Iraq but the eventual aim of a Greater Kurdistan of 15 million people (from Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria and the U.S.S.R.) should not be lost sight of.

He mentioned the possibility of British co-operation over a brick factory - an ID .5 million project which might be

/for

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for the mixed sector. Details were with Mr. Najim al Qassab, the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Industry, himself an Erbil man.

Chamber of Commerce

I called on the Chamber of Commerce some of whom said they would call on us in Baghdad, for the time being they would like:-

- (a) details of a flour mill, capacity 20-50 tons, with prices etc.
- (b) catalogues and literature, especially catalogues for Blackstone and Ruston engines.

General

We called on Abdulla Scott, an elderly Scot, who came to Iraq in 1916 and has never left. He is married to a Mosul woman and has eight children, one of whom worked as Secretary to Mr. George Booth. We were joined at lunch by Mr. Booth's co-manager, Mr. Hashim, another Kurd.

MOSUL

Muhafiz

It proved impossible to call on the Muhafiz of Mosul since he was not available on the day when I was there. The Deputy Muhafiz was also out looking at local projects. I called however on the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Abdul Jawad A. Al-Niemi who is also the general manager of Mosul Cement Company. News of my visit only reached him after I myself had made contact. I was not able to make as many contacts in Mosul as I would have liked, because the Secretary seemed keen for some reason on keeping me to himself. For instance, when I suggested calling on the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce I was told that the Secretary was more important. The Secretary appeared to have no time for the private sector and talked about little else than his own project. In this connection he said:-

- (a) There was an ID 3 million project for additions to the Mosul and Sulaimaniyah Cement Factories (ID 1.5 million each).
- (b) Fivelill (Sic) of France had supplied the original machinery but he would like to obtain British machinery. He had contemplated going to France and Britain about this.
- (c) He hoped that interested British companies would contact the Ministry of Industry or the State Organisation.

DOHUK

Governorate

I called on the Deputy Muhafiz, Ali Sinjari, the Muhafiz
/not

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not being there at the time. Mr. Sinjari is a member of the Central Committee of the KDP and a former Pish Mergah leader - a fine looking man and very friendly. With him were the Deputy Muhafiz for Administration, Raghieb Husain Mulla and the Kaimakam. They said that they were all Kurds and that consequently we could talk freely!

Mr. Sinjari stressed the backwardness of the area after referring to the lack of development which had taken place between the years 1952-1958. With the 14th July Revolution everything had stopped and the 12 years of war had left the area way behind the times. Now, however, things were better and in future all decisions would be taken by the government in Baghdad and these decisions would be made by the KDP and the Ba'ath Party. He would like to see British assistance in the development of the North and suggested that the Ambassador and I might call on the Minister of Northern Affairs who was "one of us". (In fact he was the man who led the attack on the project on the process plant in Kirkuk in March 1969.) He would like to see:-

- (a) British companies participating in development in the field of tourism and road building. In order to develop tourism it was essential that international companies of repute should manage the hotels as Iraq had not got the capacity at present.
- (b) British companies to assist in the private sector project which the government were now encouraging. He was very hopeful about this.
- (c) British aid, though this would of course have to be given through the government in Baghdad.
- (d) Settlement with the oil companies so that more money would be available for Kurdistan.

The government had been working hard on rehabilitation. Their aim was to build 10,000 houses, but priority was being given to the most needy. They had budgeted for the rebuilding of 3,000 in the current year and of those 2,850 had so far been completed.

More money was however needed. Money was also being used for roadmaking and a road was now being constructed to Kani Masir which was a splendid apple growing area. With the improved communications this area should be able in future to supply Iraq with good apples.

CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusions I draw from this tour are:-

/(a)

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- (a) The Kurds are thankful that the fighting has been brought to an end and there is no immediate sign of them wishing to renew the battle.
- (b) Conditions in the north are now comparatively normal and relaxed. Movement is easy, although there are a number of check points in certain areas, particularly on the road between Erbil and Rawanduz.
- (c) The KDP are concentrating on getting their own men into the administration in the northern governorates and achieving a degree of self government in this manner. They still however, want a very much larger slice of the financial cake from the Central Government and a louder voice in the central government itself.
- (d) Although there are a number of military garrisons, the army are not particularly in evidence.

(D. F. Hawley)(10 December 1970)

copies to:-

H.E.

Mr. R. M. Evans, Near Eastern Dept., F.C.O.

Mr. T. H. Sinclair, C.R. and E. Dept., (B. of T.) (2)

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ADDRESS TO F C O TELNO 882 OF 22/12 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
ROUTINE TO BEIRUT .

IAN MACDOWALL , REUTERS' BEIRUT CORRESPONDENT ,
RETURNED ON 21 DECEMBER FROM A VISIT TO THE NORTH,
DURING WHICH HE MET MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI . HE WILL BE
FILING AN ARTICLE FROM BEIRUT TODAY, WHICH YOU WILL
PRESUMABLY SEE.

2. MULLA MUSTAFA WAS CLEARLY FURIOUS AT THE GOVERNMENT'S
CONTINUED FAILURE TO BRING TO JUSTICE THE WOULD-BE ASSASSINS
OF HIS SON IDRIS (SEE JENNER'S LETTER TO HINCHCLIFFE 1/4 NR.
OF 14 DECEMBER). HE TOLD MACDOWALL THAT THE K.D.P. HAD
NAMED SEVERAL SUSPECTS INCLUDING FIVE KURDISH RENEGADES
(WHO WERE NOT TALABANISTS) AND TWO SENIOR OFFICERS , ONE
OF WHOM WAS BRIGADIER OMAR AL-HAZZA , COMMANDER OF THE
BAGHDAD FORCES . (WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE
OTHER).

THE K.D.P. HAD ASKED FOR THE EXECUTION OF TEN MEN , INCLUDING
THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE. MULLA MUSTAFA CLAIMED THAT THE TWO
OFFICERS WERE " REPRESENTING THE AUTHORITIES " AND THE
K.D.P. HELD HAMAD SHAHAB (MINISTER OF DEFENCE) AND SA'DUN
GHAI DAN (MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR) RESPONSIBLE .

3. HOWEVER, DESPITE MULLA MUSTAFA'S OWN PERSONAL ANGER,
THE K.D.P. SEEM TO BE STICKING TO THE LINE THAT
"PEACE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN SUCH INCIDENTS" WHICH SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO OBSTRUCT THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE MARCH
AGREEMENT.

LAST PAPER

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

R. J. M.

23/12

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